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ABSTRACT
The thesis consists of three chapters. In Chapter I (Price Caps with Capacity Precom-
mitment), we study the e¤ectiveness of price cap regulation in a monopolistic setting under
demand uncertainty. In our model, a monopolist facing an uncertain demand. In the ab-
sence of capacity precommitment, price caps remain an e¤ective regulatory instrument, just
as they are when demand is deterministic. Price caps are also an e¤ective instrument to reg-
ulate a monopoly that makes irreversible capacity investments ex-ante, and then chooses its
output up to capacity upon observing the realization of demand. In this scenario, however,
the optimal price cap must trade o¤ the incentives for capacity investment and capacity
withholding, is well above the unit cost of capacity and, when the unit cost of capacity is
low, is below the price cap that maximizes capacity. Moreover, a price cap alone cannot
eliminate ine¢ ciencies. Under standard regularity assumptions on the demand distribution,
the comparative static properties of price caps above the optimal price cap are analogous
to those they have in the absence of capacity precommitment.
The Chapter II and Chapter III are aimed at analyzing the competitive consequences of
imposition of the Arms Length Principle (ALP, henceforth) requirements for international
transfer pricing.
In order to discourage tax shifting activities by multinational rms, most countries follow
taxation policies that are based on the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises and Tax Administrations, which recommend that, for tax purposes, internal
pricing policies be consistent with ALP (i.e., that transfer prices between companies of
multinational enterprises for tax purposes be established on a market value basis, thus
comparable to transactions between independent, unrelated, parties). Moreover, ALP puts
associated and independent enterprises on a more equal footing for tax purposes, it avoids
the creation of tax advantages that would otherwise distort the relative competitive positions
of either type of entity. The failure to comply with the ALP may result in a penalty.
The OECDs recommendation that transfer prices between parent rms and their sub-
sidiaries be consistent with the ALP for tax purposes does not restrict internal pricing poli-
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cies. In Chapter II (Strategic Incentives for Keeping One Set of Books under the Arms
Length Principle), we show that under imperfect competition parent rms accounting
policies determine the properties of market outcomes: if parents keep one set of books (i.e.,
their internal transfer prices are consistent with the ALP), then competition in the exter-
nal (home) market softens (intensies) relative to an equilibrium where parent rms and
subsidiaries are integrated. In contrast, if rms keep two sets of books (i.e., their internal
transfer prices di¤er from those used for tax purposes) or maintain asymmetric accounting
policies, then competition intensies in both markets. Keeping one set of books turns out
to be an equilibrium for most of the parameter space.
In Chapter III (The Non-Neutrality of the Arms Length Principle with Imperfect Com-
petition), we show that under imperfect competition the Arms Length Principle is non-
neutral: a strict (lax) application of the ALP softens competition among subsidiaries (par-
ents). Thus, under imperfect competition regulating transfer pricing optimally requires
trading o¤ its impact on market outcomes and tax revenue.
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CHAPTER 1. PRICE CAPS WITH CAPACITY PRECOMMITMENT
1.1. Introduction
Since Littlechild (1983)s report, when precise information about cost is available, price
cap regulation is regarded as an e¤ective instrument to mitigate market power, foster cost
minimization and ultimately enhance surplus: when the demand is known with certainty,
the introduction of a binding price cap rises rmsmarginal revenue near the equilibrium
output and leads to an increase of the equilibrium output and surplus, and to a decrease
of the market price. Moreover, under broad regularity conditions on the demand and cost
functions, both output and surplus decrease (and the market price increases) with the
price cap above marginal cost. Further, in the most favorable conditions (e.g., when rms
produce the good with constant returns to scale), a price cap equal to marginal cost is able
to eliminate ine¢ ciencies.1
We study the e¤ectiveness of price cap regulation under demand uncertainty.2 In order
to avoid some potential conundrums that arise in dynamic oligopolistic settings, which are
distractions from the issue under scrutiny (the impact of price cap regulation), we focus on
the monopolistic case.
We show that in the absence of capacity precommitment, i.e., if the monopolist can
produce instantly upon the realization of demand or has slack capacity, the e¤ects of price
caps remain exactly the same as when the demand is deterministic. The results obtained
in this static setting can be easily extended to oligopolistic industries. There are important
markets in which rms have slack capacity and can respond instantly to demand conditions,
e.g., in electricity markets in which rmsbids are short lived. In these markets price caps
provide an e¤ective regulatory instrument.
1 In contrast, rate-of-return regulation, used for most of the 20th century to regulate public utilities,
distorts incentives for cost minimization see, e.g., Joskow (1972) or cost reduction see, e.g., Cabral and
Riordan (1989).
2Demand uncertainty may be interpreted also as variations of demand over time, as is common in elec-
tricity markets see, e.g., Green and Newbery (1992).
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These results naturally raise the question of how price caps a¤ect capacity decisions. In
order to tackle this issue, we consider a more interesting setting in which a monopolist
makes irreversible capacity investments ex-ante, and then chooses its output up to capacity
upon the realization of demand. (Thus, the monopolist may withhold capacity if it nds it
benecial to do so.) In this setting, ine¢ ciencies arise both because the monopolist installs
a low level of capacity in order to precommit to high prices, and because the monopolist
withholds capacity for low demand realizations in order to avoid prices to fall too low.
Capacity withholding is common in markets such as sport events, hotel accommodation,
agricultural products (in which farmer associations sometimes destroy part of the output),
etc. Capacity withholding has been observed also in electricity markets, in which generators
may declare their capacity to be unavailable.3
The e¤ect of price cap regulation with capacity precommitment (and withholding) is more
subtle. We show that, much as in the absence of capacity precommitment, the introduction
of a binding price cap raises the rmsmarginal return to capacity investment near the
equilibrium capacity and leads to an increase of the equilibrium capacity, the expected
output and the expected total surplus, and to a decrease of the expected market price.
However, price caps near the unit cost of capacity are suboptimal because they reduce
the return to capacity investment below its cost, and lead the monopolist to install no
capacity. The optimal price cap (i.e., the price cap that maximizes surplus) must trade o¤
appropriately the incentives for capacity investment and capacity withholding, and tends
to be well above the unit cost of capacity. When the unit cost of capacity is high the
e¤ect on capacity investment is dominant, and the optimal price cap maximizes capacity
investment. When the unit cost of capacity is low, reducing the price cap below the level
that maximizes capacity investment increases expected surplus. Thus, maximizing capacity
investment does not warrant maximizing expected surplus. In either case, a price cap alone,
although e¤ective, is unable to provide the appropriate incentives for capacity investment
3Data for the California electricity market during the time period May 2000-December 2001 show that
at the price cap some generators did not supply all of their uncommitted capacity see Cramton (2003) and
Joskow and Kahn (2002).
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and simultaneously eliminate the ine¢ ciencies arising from capacity withholding.
The comparative static properties of price caps are under capacity precommitment are
more complex than in the (static) setting in which the monopolist can produce an arbitrary
output upon the realization demand. Under standard regularity assumptions on the demand
distribution, the e¤ects of changes in the price cap on expected output and surplus depend
on the magnitude of its e¤ects on capacity investment and capacity withholding, which have
opposite signs. Capacity investment is maximal for a binding price cap r, which is well
above the unit cost of capacity. Further, capacity investment increases (decreases) with the
price cap below (above) r. When the unit cost of capacity is large the signs of the e¤ects of
changes in the price cap on the expected output, expected surplus, and capacity investment
coincide. Interestingly, when the unit cost of capacity is small the expected output and
surplus decrease with the price cap above and around r, and thus the optimal price cap
is below r. Also, a price cap a¤ects the market price directly, but also indirectly via its
impact on the level of capacity. Thus, an increase of the price cap increases the expected
price above and around r, but has an ambiguous e¤ect below r:
Earle et al. (2007) studies an oligopolistic model in which rms make output decisions ex-
ante, and then supply their output inelastically and unconditionally upon the realization of
demand.4 In this setting, it shows that the output is suboptimally low and may increase with
the price cap for price caps near marginal cost.5. Moreover, the comparative static properties
of price caps when the demand is deterministic fail for a generic demand schedule.6 In
addition, Early et al. (2007) claim that versions of these results extend to the case where
rms can freely dispose of their output upon observing the demand, thus choosing how
much of their output to supply, which e¤ectively yields a model equivalent to that we study
4 In this setting, Reynolds and Rietzke (2012) study entry, and Zoettl (2011) studies rmstechnological
choice.
5Depending on the distribution of demand, production may be shut down altogether.
6Specically, Earle at al. (2007) show that for any demand distribution such that output decreases with
the price cap at a given binding price cap p, it is possible to perturb the demand distribution on an arbitrarily
small interval around p (by shifting the probability on the interval to the endpoints, creating two atoms) in
such a way that with this new demand distribution output increases with the price cap near p.
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in the present paper. These results lead Earle et al. (2007) to conclude that the standard
arguments supporting the imposition of price caps break down in the presence of demand
uncertainty.
This sweeping conclusion of Earle et al. (2007) is unfounded. As we show, in the absence
of capacity precommitment the properties of price caps remain intact when demand is
uncertain. Further, with output (or capacity) precommitment, price caps near marginal cost
may lead to an expected marginal revenue close, or even below, marginal cost. Thus, the
incentives for output investment may be poor, and may improve if the price cap constrained
is relaxed. When the demand is deterministic these e¤ect do not arise, and the output
jumps up from zero to its optimal level when the price cap approaches the marginal cost
from below. When demand is uncertain (and well behaved), the output (capacity) becomes
eventually positive and increasing with the price cap as the price caps increases from below
the marginal cost. Price cap regulation is still e¤ective, but must be designed taking into
account the rmsincentives to invest in output. Moreover, Earle et al. (2007)s Theorem
4, which is to be expected, does not provide a basis for such conclusion.7 Indeed, as Grimm
and Zoettl (2010) show, under certain regularity conditions on the distribution of demand,
price cap regulation remains e¤ective, and their comparative static properties (relative to
the price cap that maximizes capacity) are recovered.
In the more interesting setting studied in the present paper, in which capacity decisions
are made ex-ante and output decisions are made ex-post, we show that under standard
regularity assumptions on the demand distribution a price cap is an e¤ective regulatory
instrument to provide incentives for capacity investment and discouraging capacity with-
holding. Moreover, the comparative static properties of price caps, although more subtle,
are analogous to those arising when demand is deterministic or when capacity has no pre-
commitment value. (Unlike in these settings, however, a price cap alone cannot eliminate
ine¢ ciencies and must trade o¤ the incentives for capacity investment and capacity with-
holding.) Further, we show in Appendix B that a crucial step in the proof of Early et al.
7By the Banach-Mazurkiewicz Theorem, in the real vector space of all real-valued continuous functions
on [0,1] with the supremum norm, even nowhere di¤erentiability is a generic property.
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(2007)s Theorem 4 fails when the monopolist can withhold capacity.8
Grimm and Zoettl (2010) also o¤er an analysis of the impact of price caps in an oligopolis-
tic setting in which rms can dispose freely of their output, which is e¤ectively equivalent
to that of the present paper. However, the reduced form analysis of this dynamic setting
provided by both Earle et al. (2007) and Grimm and Zoettl (2010) raises some questions.
For example, it is unclear what is the appropriate mode of competition to consider at the
ex-post stage. Moreover, there are well known di¢ culties therein to guarantee existence,
uniqueness and symmetry of equilibrium  see, e.g., Reynolds and Wilson (2000), Gab-
szewicz and Poddar (1997). By focusing on the monopolistic case, we did not let ourselves
get sidetracked by these issues.
Also, our results di¤er from those obtained by Grimm and Zoettl (2010), which conclude
that the properties of price caps are virtually the same both with full capacity utilization
and with capacity withholding. In particular, Grimm and Zoettl (2010) mistakenly conclude
that maximizing the expected surplus amounts to maximizing capacity. (We show that when
the cost of capacity is small maximizing surplus entails a lower price cap than the price cap
that maximizes capacity.) Apparently, the calculation of the marginal revenue in Grimm
and Zoettl (2010)s equation (5) is incorrect in region A see Section 1. 3.
Other authors have studied price cap regulation in the presence of exogenous technological
progress  in our setting the unit cost of capacity and production are constant over the
regulatory period. Biglaiser and Riordan (2000), for example, study the incentive properties
of price cap to produce optimal capacity investment and replacement. In their setting,
they nd that price caps provide better incentives than rate-of-return regulation, although
in their setting (as in ours) optimal price caps must deal with a trade o¤ involving the
incentives for capacity investment and replacement.
In an oligopolistic industry, Roques and Savva (2009) study the e¤ect of price caps on
the timing of investments when demand is uncertain, and nd that as in our setting a low
8 In fact, in our setting when the cost of capacity is low the perturbation of the demand distribution used
in the proof of Earle et al. (2007)s Theorem 4 has an e¤ect akin to that it has a at spot of a deterministic
demand: changes in the price cap on this at spot have no impact on the level of output.
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price cap may be suboptimal as it may disincentivize investment. Dobbs (2004) studies the
e¤ect intertemporal price cap regulation when a monopolist facing demand uncertainty has
to decide the size and timing of its investments, and shows that optimal price caps lead
to under investment and quantity rationing. Dixit (1991) studies a competitive market in
which demand is uncertain and rms make ex-ante irreversible investments, and shows that
introducing price ceilings lead to delay investments and higher prices over time.
The paper is organized as follows. We describe the monopoly in Section 1. 2. In Section
1. 3 we derive the monopoly equilibrium when a regulator imposes a price cap. We study
the comparative static properties of price caps in Section 1. 4. In Section 1. 5 we study
optimal price caps. We discuss an example in Section 1. 6, and we conclude in Section 1.
7. Appendix A contains technical proofs. In Appendix B we present an exercise showing
that Earle et al. (2007)s Theorem 4 fails in our setting. Appendix C studies a version of
our model assuming full capacity utilization, and discusses the di¤ering results obtained in
that setting.
1.2. Price Caps without Capacity Precommitment
Consider a monopoly that produces a good with constant returns to scale and unit cost
b 2 R+: For simplicity let the market demand be given by D(X; p) = maxfX   p; 0g: If the
demand is deterministic, i.e., if the maximum willingness to pay for the good X is known to
the rm, then the e¤ect of a price cap r 2 R+ on the monopoly equilibrium is well known.
In order to avoid the trivial case in which the monopolist produces no output, assume that
X > b. In the absence of a price cap, the monopoly equilibrium is q = (X   b)=2 and
p = (X+ b)=2: A low price cap r < b leads the monopoly to serve no output, i.e., q(r) = 0,
whereas a high (non-binding) price cap r  p has no e¤ect on the monopoly equilibrium,
i.e., q(r) = q and p(r) = p: An intermediate price cap r 2 [b; p); however, increases
the monopolists marginal revenue around q; and leads to an increase of the monopolists
output to q(r) = X   r > q; and a decrease of the market price to p(r) = r < p. See
Figure 1.1. Thus, the output q(r) (respectively, the price p(r)) decreases (increases) linearly
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with the price cap r on (b; p), and the surplus, as well as the consumer surplus, decrease
with r on this interval. Hence, setting a price cap r equal to the unit cost of production
b maximizes the output as well as the surplus.9 Figure 1.3 below provides a graph of the
function q(r).
0
X
X
b
r
q*
p*
q
p
P(q)
MR(r,q)
q(r)
Figure 1.1. The E¤ect of a Price Cap with a Deterministic Demand
Let us consider know consider the case of demand uncertainty. (As noted above, demand
uncertainty may be interpreted also as variations of demand over time see, e.g., Green
and Newbery (1992).) Assume that X is a random variable with p.d.f. f . Let us assume
that the support of X is a bounded interval [;]  R+ such that  > b: Studying the
impact of a price cap under demand uncertainty requires to specify the timing of decisions.
Let us consider a simple model in which the monopolist decides its output upon observing
the realization of demand.
In the absence of a price cap, for each demand realization x 2 [;] the monopoly
equilibrium is given by q(x) = 0 and p(x)  x if x < b, and by q(x) = (x   b)=2 and
p(x) = (x+b)=2 if x > b. Write P  = maxx2[b;] p(x) = (+b)=2: The introduction of a price
9These properties extend to symmetric oligopolistic markets see, e.g., Theorem 1 in Earle et al. (2007).
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cap r 2 R+ has a simple e¤ect on the monopoly equilibrium: a low price cap r < b leads
the monopoly to serve no output regardless of the realization of demand, i.e., Q(r; ) = 0.
A high (non-binding) price cap r  P ; results in an output Q(r; ) = q(): Intermediate
price caps r 2 [b; P ); however, have more complex e¤ects on the monopolist output: it is
easy to see that for low demand realizations x 2 [0; 2r  b); the price cap is non-binding and
the monopolist output is Q(r; x) = q(x); whereas for high demand realizations x  2r   b
the monopolist serves the demand at the price cap, i.e., Q(r; x) = x  r. See Figure 1.2.
p
r
0 q
MR (r,q)0 MR (r,q)1 MR (r,q)2
x 0
x 1
x 2
x0 x x1 2
b
q1 q2
Figure 1.2. The E¤ect of a Price Cap with Demand Uncertainty
14
Hence the expected output E(Q(r;X)) is given for r 2 (b; P ) by
E(Q(r;X)) =
1
2
Z 2r b
b
(x  b) f(x)dx+
Z 
2r b
(x  r) f(x)dx:
Di¤erentiating this expression, and noting that  > 2r   b for r < P ; yields
dE(Q(r;X))
dr
=  
Z 
2r b
f(x)dx < 0:
Thus, as in the case of demand certainty the expected output and the expected surplus
decrease with the price cap on (b; P ). The expected price is not well dened since for
x < b the monopolist supplies no output. However, decreasing the price cap decreases
the market price for demand realizations x > 2r   b; and has no e¤ect on the market
price for demand realizations x 2 (b; 2r   b); and therefore unambiguously decreases the
expected price over the realizations in which there is trade. Thus, as in the case of a
deterministic demand, when demand is stochastic setting a price cap r equal to the unit
cost of production b maximizes the expected output as well as the expected surplus. We
summarize these results in Proposition 1.1.
Proposition 1.1. Consider a monopolist facing an uncertain demand, and assume that
it is not capacity constrained (i.e., may produce the good instantly upon the realization of
demand). Then a binding price cap leads to an increase of the equilibrium output and
surplus, and a decrease of the expected price. Moreover, the output and surplus (expected
price) decrease (increases) with the price cap price for binding price caps above marginal
cost. Further, a price cap equal to marginal cost maximizes surplus, and leads to an e¢ cient
outcome.
Thus, whether the demand is deterministic or stochastic, price cap regulation is an e¤ec-
tive instrument to mitigate market power and foster e¢ ciency. Figure 1.3 illustrates these
conclusions the functions q(r) and E(Q(r;X)) are calculated assuming that X = 1=2 and
X is distributed uniformly on [0; 1], respectively. Proposition 1.1 can be easily extended to
a Cournot oligopolistic setting.
15
0 b r
E(Q(P*,X))
E(Q(b,X))
q
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Figure 1.3. Output with Demand Certainty and Demand Uncertainty.
This analysis is useful when rms are not capacity constrained and produce instantly
upon the realization of demand. Relevant examples are the Spanish or California electricity
markets, in which (at least in recent times) rms have excess capacity and their bids are
short lived (i.e., rms compete to serve the demand for short periods of time, e.g., an hourly
or half hourly periods). Of course, price cap regulation has an impact on rmscapacity
investments, which are long run decisions made prior the realization of demand. Thus,
endogenizing rmscapacity investment decisions seems a natural next step to take.
In what follows we study the impact of price caps in a model in which the monopolist
makes ex-ante capacity investment decisions and then, upon observing the realization of de-
mand, decides how much to produce, and may withhold capacity if doing so is benecial. In
this setting the level of capacity is a long run decision, whereas the level of output is a short
run decision. One may also interpret this setting as if the monopolist decides its output
before demand is realized, but once demand is realized the monopolist decides how much to
16
supply, and may supply less than its total output. Relevant examples include the electric-
ity markets mentioned above, markets for agricultural products (in which producers may
destroy part of their output if doing so is benecial), sport events, hotel accommodation,
etc.
Earle et al. (2007) and Grimm and Zoettl (2010) study an arguable less interesting
model in which rms decide their output ex-ante and supply it inelastically whatever the
realization of demand. Such a model may be of interest in, e.g., electricity markets in which
rms bids are long lived (i.e., a rm must commit to supply their capacity during the entire
day). Appendix C provides an analysis in our setting of the e¤ect of price caps in this model
of full capacity utilization. This analysis allows for a comparison of the e¤ects of price caps
with and without capacity withholding. We discuss this issue in the concluding session.
Also, both Earle et al. (2007) and Grimm and Zoettl (2010) claim to have results for the
model of capacity investment and withholding we study in the present paper. However, it
is unclear whether their reduced form analysis is correct in this dynamic setting. Moreover,
some of their conclusions are incorrect. Specically, we show in Appendix B that the proof
of Theorem 6 in Earle et al. (2007) is incorrect. Also a mistake in the calculations of Grimm
and Zoettl (2010) leads to wrong conclusions the e¤ects of price caps we comment on this
issue below.
1.3. Capacity Precommitment and Withholding
Consider a monopolist facing an uncertain demand that must decide how much capacity to
install before the demand is realized. We assume that the cost of installing a unit of capacity
is a positive constant c: Once capacity is installed the good can be produced with constant
returns to scale up to capacity. We assume without loss of generality that the production
cost is zero. As in Section 1. 2, the market demand is D(X; p) = maxfX   p; 0g, where X
is a random variable. The monopolist decides its output upon observing the realization of
the demand parameter X: In order to reduce notation, we assume that the support of X is
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the interval [0; 1].10 Also we denote by f and F the p.d.f. and c.d.f. of X; respectively, and
assume that E(X) > c in order to rule out the trivial cases in which the monopolist installs
no capacity.
Assume that a regulatory agency imposes a price cap r 2 [0; 1]: Since the cost of capacity
is sunk and the cost of production cost (up to capacity) is zero, then at the stage of output
choice the monopolist maximizes revenue. If the monopolist had an unlimited capacity,
then the equilibrium output is that calculated in Section 1. 2 for b = 0; i.e., for x 2 [0; 1];
Q(r; x) = x   r  1   r if r < x=2; and Q(r; x) = x=2  1=2 if r  x=2: Hence levels of
capacity k > maxf1  r; 1=2g are suboptimal since the monopolist would always have idling
capacity, and therefore may increase its prot by installing less capacity since c > 0. Thus,
we restrict attention to price cap-capacity pairs (r; k) 2 [0; 1]2 such that k  maxf1 r; 1=2g.
Figure 1.4 describes a partition of this set of price cap-capacity pairs into three regions,
A = f(r; k) 2 [0; 1]2 j r  k  1   rg, B = f(r; k) 2 [0; 1]2 j k < minf1   r; rgg, and
C = f(r; k) 2 [0; 1]2 j 1   r  k  1=2g. We calculate the equilibrium price P (r; k; x) and
output Q(r; k; x) in these regions for each realization x of the demand parameter X.
0
1
1
k
r
A
B
C
k=1-r k=r
1/2
Figure 1.4. Relevant Price Cap-Capacity Pairs.
10This assumption facilitates the presentation and the interpretation of our results, but entails a small
loss of generality because the cost of production given capacity and the lower bound of the support of X
coincide.
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Table 1.1A describes the prices and output for (r; k) 2 A.
X [0; 2r) [2r; r + k) [r + k; 1]
P (r; k; x) x=2 r r
Q(r; k; x) x=2 x  r k
Table 1.1A: Equilibrium output and price for (r; k) 2 A.
Figure 1.5 illustrates the results in Table 1. 1A. For low demand realizations x < 2r
marginal revenue remains positive for levels of output greater than the demand at the price
cap, q = x r; therefore neither the price cap nor the level of capacity are binding; hence the
outcome is the unconstrained monopoly equilibrium, i.e., q = p = x=2. For intermediate
demand realizations x 2 [2r; r + k) marginal revenue for levels of output greater than
q = x   r is negative, and therefore the price cap is binding; the monopolist serves the
demand at the price cap, and withholds capacity. (Hence for low and intermediate demand
realizations a marginal decrease of the price cap leads to an increase of output, much as
in the models of Section 1. 2.) For high demand realizations x  r + k marginal revenue
equals the price cap up to the level of capacity, and hence the monopolist supplies its entire
capacity, the price cap remains binding, and the demand is rationed. Note that for price
cap-capacity pairs in this region the market price P (r; k; x) is independent of the level of
installed capacity k:
19
pr
0 q2r r+k
k
MR (r,q)0
MR (r,q)1
MR (r,q)2
x 0
x 1
x 2
x0 x x1 2r
Figure 1.5. The E¤ect of a Price Cap when (r; k) 2 A.
Table 1. 1B describes the prices and output for (r; k) 2 B.
X [0; 2k) [2k; r + k) [r + k; 1]
P (r; k; x) x=2 x  k r
Q(r; k; x) x=2 k k
Table 1.1B: Equilibrium output and price for (r; k) 2 B.
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Figure 1.6 illustrates the results in Table 1. 1B. For low demand realizations x < 2k
the expected marginal revenue is negative for output levels equal to k and x < r, and
therefore neither the price cap nor the level of capacity are binding; hence the outcome
is the unconstrained monopoly equilibrium, i.e., q = p = x=2. For intermediate demand
realizations x 2 [2k; r+k) marginal revenue is positive for output levels greater than k; and
therefore the monopolist supplies its full capacity, i.e., q = k; the price cap is non-binding
since p = x   k < r + k   k = r. (Thus, for these realizations changes in the price cap
have a¤ects neither the level of output nor the market price.) For high demand realizations
x > r + k the monopolist continues supplying its entire capacity, i.e., q = k, but the price
cap becomes binding, i.e., p = r, and the demand is rationed, i.e., x   p = x   r > q. In
this region the market price P (r; k; x) depends on the level of capacity
.
p
r
0 q
k
MR (r,q)0 MR (r,q)1 MR (r,q)2
x 0
x 1
x 2
x0 x x1 2r 2k k+r
Figure 1.6. The E¤ect of a Price Cap when (r; k) 2 B.
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Table 1.1C describes the prices and output for (r; k) 2 C.
X [0; 2k) [2k; 1]
P (r; k; x) x=2 x  k
Q(r; k; x) x=2 k
Table 1.1C: Equilibrium output and price for (r; k) 2 C.
In region C, the price cap is never binding. The monopolist withholds capacity only for
low demand realizations x < 2k, and supplies its entire capacity otherwise. Demand is
never rationed. The market price P (r; k; x) depends on the level of capacity.
Note an important feature of equilibrium that stands in contrast to the case where the
monopolist is not capacity constrained: when both capacity and the price cap are binding,
demand is rationed.
The monopolists revenue is
R(r; k; x) = P (k; r; x)Q(r; k; x);
and its expected prot is
(r; k) = E (R(r; k;X)  ck) = E (R(r; k;X))  ck;
Clearly  is continuous on A [B [ C:
In equilibrium, the monopolists capacity maximizes (r; ). Thus, in an interior equilib-
rium the capacity k is such that the monopolists expected marginal revenue from installing
an additional innitesimal unit of capacity MR(r; k); where
MR(r; k) :=
@E (R(r; k;X))
@k
;
is equal to the marginal cost of capacity c; i.e., k solves
MR(r; k) = c: (1)
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In addition, the second order condition
@MR(r; k)
@k
< 0 (2)
holds at k.
Using the results described in tables 1.1A, 1.1B and 1.1C we readily calculate the mo-
nopolists expected revenue
E (R(r; k;X)) =
Z 1
0
P (k; r; x)Q(r; k; x)f(x)dx
for (r; k) in either A; B or C: Di¤erentiating this expression we obtain the expected marginal
revenue, which is
MR(r; k) =
Z 1
r+k
rf(x)dx (3)
for (r; k) 2 A;
MR(r; k) =
Z r+k
2k
(x  2k) f(x)dx+
Z 1
r+k
rf(x)dx (4)
for (r; k) 2 B; and
MR(r; k) =
Z 1
2k
(x  2k)f(x)dx (5)
for (r; k) 2 C. Since (3) and (4) coincide for k = r, and (4) and (5) coincide for r > 1=2
and k = 1  r, then MR in continuous on A [B [ C.
In region A; increasing marginally capacity a¤ects the revenue only for high demand
realizations x > r + k for which the monopolist supplies its entire capacity. For these
demand realizations the price cap r is binding. Thus, the expected revenue increases by r
times the probability that the additional marginal unit of capacity is supplied, i.e.,
MR(r; k) = r[1  F (r + k)];
which is a version of equation (3). In region B; a marginal increase of capacity increases
revenue not only for demand realizations x > r + k, but also for intermediate demand
realizations 2k < x < r + k; in which the price cap is non-binding and the monopolists
supplies its full capacity; therefore the marginal revenue is independent of the price cap. In
region C, a marginal increase of capacity a¤ects the revenue only when the demand at the
price cap exceeds capacity, i.e., when x > r + k.
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Di¤erentiating MR we get
@MR(r; k)
@k
=  rf(r + k) < 0 (6)
for (r; k) 2 A;
@MR(r; k)
@k
=  kf (r + k)  2 [F (r + k)  F (2k)] < 0 (7)
for (r; k) 2 B; and
@MR(r; k)
@k
=  2 [1  F (2k)] < 0 (8)
for (r; k) 2 C: Hence the expected marginal revenue function MR is decreasing, and there-
fore the inequality (2) holds on A [B [ C. Moreover, since (6) and (7) coincide for k = r;
then MR is di¤erentiable on A [B [ C, except perhaps in the boundary of B and C:
Thus, for all r 2 [0; 1] the monopolists equilibrium capacity k(r) is the unique solution
of the equation (1). Moreover, the Maximum Theorem implies that k is a continuous
function. We summarize these results in Proposition 1.2.
Proposition 1.2. The monopoly equilibrium capacity k is a well dened continuous func-
tion of the price cap all r 2 [0; 1].
Calculating the equilibrium capacity is somewhat involved. Obviously, the equilibrium
capacity is zero for price caps below the unit cost of capacity c. Moreover, it is easy to
see that the equilibrium capacity is also zero for price caps r above but near the unit
cost of capacity: because the probability of demand realizations x < c is positive, for r
above but near c the expected marginal revenue is below c even for k = 0. Therefore
installing capacity entails losses. Thus, the equilibrium capacity is zero unless the price cap
is su¢ ciently high that expected marginal revenue for levels of capacity near zero is greater
than c, i.e., r  r(c); where r is dened by the equation MR(r; 0) = c: Hence, unlike in the
setting in which the monopolist makes output decisions ex-post, price caps near the unit
cost of capacity are suboptimal.11
11 If the lower bound of the support of X is  > c (instead of zero as we have assumed), then for r = c
the expected marginal revenue is c and prots are zero for k 2 [0;   c], whereas prots are negative for
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As in the setting in which the monopolist makes output decisions ex-post, su¢ ciently
large price caps are non-binding. The upper bound on the interval of binding price caps is
determined by the distribution of the demand parameter X; specically this bound r(c) is
dened by the equation c =MR(r; 1  r):
Intermediate price caps r 2 [r(c); r(c)) a¤ect the equilibrium capacity in more complex
ways. We are able to identify the level of capacity assuming that the hazard rate of X is
increasing. In particular, as we shall see in the next section, unlike in the setting in which the
monopolist makes output decisions ex-post, the equilibrium capacity is not monotonically
decreasing with the price cap in this interval.
Proposition 1.3 makes these results precise. WriteM for the maximum value ofM(r) :=
MR(r; r) on (0; 1=2): If c < M; then the equationM(r) = c has two solutions r (c); r+(c);
which satisfy r(c) < r (c) < r+(c) < r(c) <1. If c  M, then c  MR(r; r) for all
r 2 [0; 1=2]. The proof of Proposition 1.3, which is given in Appendix A, establishes these
properties.
Proposition 1.3. (1.3.1) The equilibrium capacity is k(r) = 0 whenever r 2 [0; r(c)), and
is k(r) = kC , where kC solves the equationZ 1
2k
(x  2k)f(x)dx = c;
whenever r 2 [r(c); 1].
(1.3.2) Assume that the hazard rate of X is increasing. If c 2 (0;M), then the equilibrium
capacity is k(r) = kA(r); where
kA(r) = F
 1(1  c
r
)  r
whenever r 2 [r (c); r+(c)], and is k(r) = kB(r); where kB solves the equationZ r+k
2k
(x  2k) f(x)dx+
Z 1
r+k
rf(x)dx = c;
k >    c: Hence the equilibrium capacity may be positive, and may increase or decrease with r near the
unit cost of capacity depending of the distribution of demand. See Grimm and Zoettl (2010)s Section 4 for
a discussion of this issue.
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whenever r 2 (r(c); r(c))n[r (c); r+(c)]. If c 2 (M; E(X)), then the equilibrium capacity
is k(r) = kB(r) for all r 2 [r(c); r(c)).
Using the results in tables 1.1A, 1.1B and 1.1C, and the description on the equilibrium
capacity given in Proposition 1.3, one can calculate the expected output and market price
as well as the expected (consumer and total) surplus, thus providing a complete description
of the monopoly equilibrium. We study in the next section the e¤ect of changes in the price
cap on these values.
1.4. Comparative Statics
In this section we study the comparative static properties of price caps. We show that if
the hazard rate of X is increasing and its p.d.f. f is continuously di¤erentiable, then there
is a price cap that maximizes the equilibrium capacity r(c) 2 (r(c); r(c)): Moreover, we
show that the equilibrium capacity increases with the price cap on the interval (r(c); r(c));
and decreases with the price cap on the interval (r(c); r(c)). Thus, relative to the capacity
maximizing price cap r(c) the e¤ects of price caps on capacity (and welfare, as we shall see
in the next section) are analogous, although more subtle, than when the monopolist is not
capacity constrained. Two important di¤erences are worth noticing: For low price caps,
i.e., price caps above but near r(c) > c, capacity increases with the price cap, and therefore
the price cap that maximizes capacity is above the marginal cost. Moreover, when the unit
cost of capacity is small, the price cap that maximizes expected output is below r(c), but
the above the unit cost of capacity. (Recall that for a capacity unconstrained monopoly
setting a price cap equal to marginal cost maximizes output see Proposition 1.1.)
Let r 2 (r(c); r(c)): Since the expected marginal revenue MR(r; k) is di¤erentiable in
regions A [B; we can di¤erentiate equation (1) to get
@MR(r; k)
@k
dk +
@MR(r; k)
@r
dr = 0:
And since MR is decreasing, i.e.,
@MR(r; k)
@k
< 0;
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then
dk
dr
=  @MR(r; k)
@r

@MR(r; k)
@k
 1
;
and
dk
dr
T 0, @MR(r; k)
@r
T 0:
Assume that f (the c.d.f. of X) is continuously di¤erentiable. Then MR is twice contin-
uously di¤erentiable, and
d2k
dr2
=  

@MR(r; k)
@k
 1
d
dr

@MR(r; k(r))
@r

+
@MR(r; k)
@r

@MR(r; k)
@k
 2
d
dr

@MR(r; k(r))
@k

=  

@MR(r; k)
@k
 1
d
dr

@MR(r; k(r))
@r

+
dk
dr
d
dr

@MR(r; k(r))
@k

:
Hence, for r such that dk=dr = 0; we have
d2k
dr2
T 0, d
dr

@MR(r; k(r))
@r

T 0:
Denote by h the hazard rate of X, i.e., h (x) = f (x) =[1   F (x)] for all x 2 (0; 1): If
(r; k(r)) 2 A, then di¤erentiating MR given in (3) yields
@MR(r; k)
@r
= 1  F (r + k)  rf(r + k) = (1  F (r + k)) (1  rh (r + k)) ;
and
d
dr

@MR(r; k(r))
@r

=  f(r + k)

1 +
dkA
dr

(1  rh (r + k))
  (1  F (r + k))  h (r + k) + rh0 (r + k)1 + dkA
dr

:
Assume that dkA=dr = 0. Then 1  rh (r + k(r)) = 0, and
d
dr

@MR(r; k(r))
@r

=   (1  F (r + k(r)))  h (r + k(r)) + rh0 (r + k(r)) :
If the hazard rate is increasing (i.e., h0 > 0), then we have
d2kA
dr2
< 0;
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and therefore every critical point of kA is a local maximum.
If (r; kB(r)) 2 B; then di¤erentiating MR given in (4) yields
@MR(r; k)
@r
= 1  F (r + k)  kf(r + k) = (1  F (r + k)) (1  kh(r + k)) ;
and
d
dr

@MR(r; k(r))
@r

=  f(r + k(r)) (1  k(r)h(r + k(r)))

1 +
dkB
dr

  (1  F (r + k(r))) k(r)h0(r + k(r))

1 +
dkB
dr

  (1  F (r + k(r)))h(r + k(r))dkB
dr
:
Assume that dkB=dr = 0. Then 1  k(r)h (r + k(r)) = 0, and
d
dr

@MR(r; k(r))
@r

=   (1  F (r + k(r))) k(r)h0(r + k(r)):
If the hazard rate is increasing (i.e., h0 > 0) we have
d2kB
dr2
< 0;
and therefore every critical point of kB is a local maximum.
Thus, for r 2 (r(c); r(c)); d2k(r)=dr2 < 0 whenever dk(r)=dr = 0: Moreover, since
kB(r(c)) = 1  r(c), and
@MR(r; 1  r)
@r

r=r(c)
= 1  F (r(c) + (1  r(c)))  (1  r(c)) f (r(c) + (1  r(c)))
=   (1  r(c)) f(1)
< 0;
then dkB(r(c))=dr < 0: And since kB(r(c)) = 0, and
@MR(r; 0)
@r

r=r(c)
= 1  F (r(c)) > 0;
then dkB(r(c))=dr > 0: Hence k has a global maximum at some r(c) 2 (r(c); r(c)) ; and
satises dk=dr > 0 on (r(c); r(c)) and dk=dr < 0 on (r(c); r(c))  see Lemma 1 in
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Appendix A. Since k is continuous on [0; 1], is equal to zero on [0; r(c))) and is equal to kC
on [r(c); 1); this implies that k is quasi-concave, i.e., single peak, on [0; 1].
We state these results in Proposition 1.4.
Proposition 1.4. Assume that the hazard rate of X is increasing and its p.d.f. f is
continuously di¤erentiable. Then k is quasi-concave and has a global maximum at some
r(c) 2 (r(c); r(c)). Moreover, dk(r)=dr is positive on (r(c); r(c)), and is negative on
(r(c); r(c)):
It is also useful to calculate the expected output and the expected price using the results
described in tables 1.1A, 1.1B and 1.1C, and to examine how they are a¤ected by changes
of the price cap. The expected output is
E(Q(r; k(r); X) =
Z 2r
0
x
2
f(x)dx+
Z r+k(r)
2r
(x  r)f(x)dx+
Z 1
r+k(r)
k(r)f(x)dx;
for r 2 [r (c); r+(c)]; and
E(Q(r; k(r); X) =
Z 2k(r)
0
x
2
f(x)dx+
Z 1
2k(r)
k(r)f(x)dx
for r 2 (r(c); r(c))n[r (c); r+(c)]. Thus,
dE(Q(r; k(r); X)
dr
=  [F (r + k(r))  F (2r)] + dk

dr
(1  F (r + k(r)))
for r 2 [r (c); r+(c)], and
dE(Q(r; k(r); X)
dr
=
dk
dr
(1  F (2k(r)))
for r 2 (r(c); r(c))n[r (c); r+(c)].
Hence
dk
dr
 0) dE(Q(r; k
(r); X)
dr
< 0
for r 2 [r (c); r+(c)], that is, the expected output decreases with the price cap beyond the
price cap that maximizes capacity, and therefore the price cap that maximizes output is
below r(c). Moreover,
dE(Q(r; k(r); X)
dr
R 0, dk

dr
R 0:
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for r 2 [r(c); r(c))n[r (c); r+(c)], that is, the expected output increases with the price cap
for r 2 (r(c); r(c)); and decreases for r 2 (r(c); r(c)).
Likewise for r 2 [r (c); r+(c)] the expected price is
E(P (r; k(r); X) =
Z 2r
0
x
2
f(x)dx+
Z 1
2r
rf(x)dx;
and for r 2 (r(c); r(c))n[r (c); r+(c)] it is
E(P (r; k(r); X) =
Z 2k(r)
0
x
2
f(x)dx+
Z r+k(r)
2k(r)
(x  k(r))f(x)dx+
Z 1
r+k(r)
rf(x)dx:
Hence, for r 2 [r (c); r+(c)]
dE(P (r; k(r); X)
dr
= 1  F (2r) > 0;
that is, the expected price unambiguously increases with the price cap on [r (c); r+(c)]:
This result is easy to understand: for (r; k) 2 A the market price P (r; k;X) is independent
of k, and therefore a change in the price cap only has a direct (positive) e¤ect on P: Hence
the expected market price increases with the price cap regardless of its impact on capacity.
For r 2 (r(c); r(c))n[r (c); r+(c)];
dE(P (r; k(r); X)
dr
=  dk

dr
[F (r + k(r))  F (2k(r))] + [1  F (r + k(r))];
and therefore
dk
dr
 0) dE(P (r; k
(r); X)
dr
> 0:
These results are also clear: for (r; k) 2 B the market price P (r; k;X) depends on k, and
therefore a change in the price cap has a direct (positive) e¤ect on P , but also has an
indirect e¤ect on P via its impact on the level of capacity. When this indirect e¤ect is also
positive, i.e., when dk=dr < 0; then the total e¤ect is positive, but when the indirect e¤ect
is negative, the sign of the total e¤ect is ambiguous.
Under the assumptions of Proposition 1.4, dk=dr < 0 on (r(c); r(c)): Hence
dE(P (r; k(r); X)=dr > 0 on ([r (c); r+(c)] \ [0; 1]) [ [r(c); r(c)): Obviously, changes in
the price cap have no e¤ect on the expected price for r 2 [0; r(c)] [ [r(c); 1]. Otherwise the
sign of dE(P (r; k(r); X)=dr is ambiguous.
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We summarize these results in Proposition 1.5.
Proposition 1.5. Assume that the hazard rate of X is increasing and its p.d.f. f is
continuously di¤erentiable.
(1.5.1) If r(c) 2 (r (c); r+(c)), then the expected output decreases with the price cap
above and around r(c), and the expected price increases with the price cap on [r (c); r(c)):
(1.5.2) If r(c) 2 (r(c); r(c))n[r (c); r+(c)], then the expected output increases with the
price cap on (r(c); r(c)) and decreases on (r(c); r(c)), and the expected price increases
with the price cap on [r(c); r(c)):
Thus, with capacity precommitment the comparative static properties of price caps are
more subtle than in the absence of capacity precommitment: when c is su¢ ciently small,
the capacity maximizing price cap r(c) 2 (r (c); r+(c)) does not warrant maximizing the
expected output: decreasing the price cap below r(c) leads to an increase of the expected
output even though installed capacity decreases. Of course, this fact has direct implications
on the price cap that maximizes the expected surplus, as we shall see in the next section.
1.5. Optimal Price Caps
A regulator who wants to maximize the expected surplus using a price cap as its single
instrument, and cannot force the monopolist to serve its full capacity, must trade o¤ the
incentives for capacity investment and capacity withholding, and must account for the cost
of installing capacity (some of which may be seldom utilized). Thus, the optimal price
cap may di¤er from the price cap that maximizes capacity investment r(c). (In contrast,
in the model of full capacity utilization studied by Earle et al. (2007) and Grimm and
Zoettl (2010), maximizing the expected surplus simply amounts to maximizing capacity 
see Appendix C.) Indeed, we show that when the unit cost of capacity is small this is the
case: the optimal price cap is below r(c). When the unit cost of capacity is high, however,
providing appropriate incentives for capacity investment becomes the dominant objective,
and thus the optimal price cap is r(c).
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Following the literature, we simplify somewhat the problem by assuming e¢ cient ra-
tioning, i.e., when the price cap is binding the consumers with the largest willingness to
pay receive priority to buy the good. Table 1.s 2A describes the surplus S(r; k;X) for each
realization of the demand parameter when (r; k) 2 A.
X [0; 2r) [2r; r + k) [r + k; 1]
S(r; k; x) 38x
2 1
2(x
2   r2) 12 (2x  k) k
Table 1.2A: Social Surplus in Region A:
Recall that the monopolist withholds capacity for demand realizations x 2 [0; r + k):
Hence the expected surplus depends directly on the price cap, as well as indirectly through
its e¤ect on the monopolist capacity decision. The expected surplus for (r; k) 2 A is
E(S(r; k;X)) =
3
8
Z 2r
0
x2f(x)dx+
1
2
Z r+k
2r
(x2   r2)f(x)dx (9)
+
1
2
Z 1
r+k
(2x  k)kf(x)dx  ck:
Table 1.2BC below describes the surplus S(r; k;X) for each demand realization when
(r; k) 2 B [ C:
X [0; 2k) [2k; 1]
S(r; k;X) 38x
2 1
2 (2x  k) k
Table 1.2BC: Social Surplus in Regions B and C.
In B[C a price cap has no direct e¤ect on the expected surplus, but only has an indirect
e¤ect via its inuence on the monopolist capacity choice. (Of course, the price cap also
determines the distribution of surplus.) The expected surplus for (r; k) 2 B [ C is
E(S(r; k;X)) =
3
8
Z 2k
0
x2f(x)dx+
1
2
Z 1
2k
(2x  k) kf(x)dx  ck: (10)
The optimal price cap maximizes the surplus S(r) := E(S(r; k(r); X):
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For price caps r 2 [r (c); r+(c)] the price cap-equilibrium capacity pair (r; k(r)) is in
region A: Di¤erentiating S given in (9) yields
d S(r)
dr
=  r[F (r + k(r))  F (2r)] + dk
(r)
dr
 Z 1
r+k(r)
(x  k(r))f(x)dx  c
!
;
Recall that r(c) is the capacity maximizing price cap identied in Proposition 1.4. If
r(c) 2 [r (c); r+(c)]; then dk(r(c))=dr = 0 and k(r(c)) = kA(r(c)) > r(c) imply
d S(r(c))
dr
=  r(c)[F (r(c) + k(r(c)))  F (2r(c))] < 0: (11)
Hence the expected surplus decreases with the price cap at r(c). Even though decreas-
ing the price cap below r(c) decreases capacity, it discourages capacity withholding and
increases surplus. Hence the optimal price cap is below r(c):
For price caps r 2 [0; 1]n[r (c); r+(c)] we have (r; k(r)) 2 B [C: Di¤erentiating S given
in (10) yields
d S(r)
dr
=
dk(r)
dr
 Z 1
2k(r)
(x  k(r))f(x)dx  c
!
: (12)
For r 2 (r(c); r(c))n[r (c); r+(c)]; we have (r; k(r)) 2 B, k(r) < r, and
MR(r; k(r)) =
Z r+k(r)
2k(r)
(x  2k(r)) f(x)dx+
Z 1
r+k(r)
rf(x)dx = c:
HenceZ 1
2k(r)
(x  k(r))f(x)dx  c =
Z r+k(r)
2k(r)
k(r)f(x)dx+
Z 1
r+k(r)
(x  k(r)  r)f(x)dx > 0;
and therefore
d S(r)
dr
= 0, dk
(r)
dr
= 0:
Di¤erentiating d S(r)=dr we get
d2 S(r)
dr2
=
d2k(r)
dr2
 Z 1
2k(r)
(x  k(r))f(x)dx  c
!
 

dk(r)
dr
2
[1  F (2k(r))]  2k(r)f(2k(r)):
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If d S(r)=dr = 0; then dk(r)=dr = 0; which as shown above implies d2k(r)=dr2 < 0. Hence
d2 S(r)=dr2 < 0: Thus, by Lemma 1.1 if r(c) 2 (r(c); r(c))n[r (c); r+(c)]; then r(c) is the
unique global maximizer of S on (r(c); r(c)).
Note that since in the boundary of regions A and B[C the equilibrium capacity is k(r) =
r, then the expression for d S(r)=dr in equations (11) and (12) coincide, and therefore S is
di¤erentiable on [0; 1]. Proposition 1.6 summarizes these results.
Proposition 1.6. Assume that hazard rate of X is increasing and its p.d.f. f is con-
tinuously di¤erentiable, and let r(c) be the capacity maximizing price cap identied in
Proposition 1.4. If r(c) 2 [r (c); r+(c)] then the expected surplus decreases with the price
cap above and around r(c), whereas if r(c) 2 [0; 1]n(r (c); r+(c)), then r(c) maximizes
the expected surplus.
In the absence of capacity precommitment an optimal price cap r(c) = c eliminates all
ine¢ ciencies. With capacity precommitment, however, an optimal price cap has to trade
o¤ the incentives for capacity investment and capacity withholding. When the unit cost of
capacity is su¢ ciently small that r(c) 2 [r (c); r+(c)], it is socially optimal to set up a low
price cap r < r(c); even at the cost of reducing capacity. Moreover, a price cap alone is
unable to eliminate ine¢ ciencies, i.e., to provide the appropriate incentives to install the
optimal level of capacity and discourage capacity withholding.
We show that whether the optimal price cap is r(c) or it is below, the level of capacity
installed by the monopolist, k(r(c)); is below the level that will be socially optimal if
the entire capacity was served for each demand realization. Let us consider the articial
scenario in which a regulator chooses the level of capacity, and controls its use, in order
to maximize surplus. In this scenario the surplus is realized when the level of capacity is
k 2 [0; 1] is
S(k) =
1
2
Z k
0
x2f(x)dx+
1
2
Z 1
k
(2x  k)kf(x)dx  ck:
The socially optimal level of capacity kW maximizes S(k). Di¤erentiating S yields
dS(k)
dk
=
Z 1
k
(x  k) f(x)dx  c;
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and
d2S(k)
dk2
=  [1  F (k)] < 0:
Thus, kW solves the equation dS(k)=dk = 0:
It is easy to show that kW > k(r(c))  k(r) for all r 2 [0; 1]. Let us x c and reduce
notation by writing k and r for k(r(c)) and r(c); respectively. If r 2 [r (c); r+(c)],
then k  r and
MR(r; k) =
Z 1
r+k
rf(x)dx = c
imply
dS(k)
dk

k=k
=
Z 1
k
(x  k) f(x)dx 
Z 1
r+k
rf(x)dx
=
Z r+k
k
(x  k)f(x)dx+
Z 1
r+k
(x  r   k)f(x)dx
> 0:
Hence kW > k. If r 2 (r(c); r(c))n[r (c); r+(c)], then k  r and
MR(r; k) =
Z r+k
2k
(x  2k)f(x)dx+
Z 1
r+k
rf(x)dx = c
imply
dS(k)
dk

k=k
=
Z 1
k
(x  k)f(x)dx 
 Z r+k
2k
(x  2k)f(x)dx+
Z 1
r+k
rf(x)dx
!
=
Z 2k
k
(x  k) f(x)dx
+
Z r+k
2k
kf(x)dx+
Z 1
r+k
(x  r   k)f(x)dx
> 0:
Hence kW > k as well.
Thus, a price cap alone cannot provide appropriate incentives to install the optimal level
of capacity and simultaneously eliminate the ine¢ ciencies arising from capacity withholding.
(It is worth noticing that when the monopolist cannot withhold capacity a price cap is not
able to induce the monopolist to install the optimal level of capacity either. Moreover, when
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the monopolist cannot withhold capacity, then both the surplus and the level of capacity
installed with the optimal price cap are below S(r) and k(r), respectively. See Figure 1.12
in Appendix C. Thus, if the only regulatory instrument available, in addition to imposing
a price cap, is whether or not capacity withholding is permissible, then allowing capacity
withholding is the best choice.)
1.6. An Example
Assume thatX is uniformly distributed on [0; 1]; i.e., f(x) = 1. Thus, X has an increasing
hazard rate h(x) = (1  x) 1; and its p.d.f. f is continuously di¤erentiable. Since E(X) =
1=2, we consider values of the unit costs of capacity c 2 (0; 1=2).
Let us calculate the equilibrium capacity in this setting. The function kA is given by
kA(r) = F
 1(1  c
r
)  r = 1  c
r
  r:
The marginal revenue given in (4) is
MR(r; k) =
k2
2
+
r
2
[2 (1  2k)  r]:
Solving equation (1) yields
kB(r) = 2r  
p
2c  r (2  5r):
The marginal revenue given in (5) is
MR(r; k) =
1
2
(1  2k)2 :
Solving equation (1) yields
kC =
1 p2c
2
:
Let us calculate the functions r; r , r+ and r: The function r is the solution to the
equation
c =MR(r; 0) =
Z r
0
xf(x)dx+ r (1  F (r)) = r (2  r)
2
;
i.e.,
r(c) = 1 p1  2c:
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The function M is given by
M(r) =MR(r; r) = r (1  F (2r)) = r(1  2r):
The functions r  and r+ are the smaller and larger solutions to the equation
c =M(r);
are readily calculated as
r (c) =
1
4
 
1 p1  8c ; r+(c) = 1
4
 
1 +
p
1  8c :
These functions are well dened for c 2 (0; 1=8), whereM = 1=8 is the maximum value the
M . For c > 1=8 the above equation has no solution on [0; 1], i.e., the interval [r (c); r+(c)]
is empty. The function r solves the equation
c =MR(r; 1  r) =
Z 1
2(1 r)
xf(x)dx  2 (1  r) [1  F (2 (1  r))] = (1  2r)
2
2
;
i.e.,
r(c) =
1 +
p
2c
2
:
It is easy to check that for c 2 (0; 1=2) we have
c < r(c) <
1
2
< r(c) < 1:
Further, for c 2 (0; 1=8) we have
r(c) < r (c) < r+(c) <
1
2
< r(c):
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Figure 1.7. Equilibrium Capacity.
Figure 1.7 provides a description of the function k for value of c 2 (0; 1=2). For
c  1=9 the equilibrium capacity k(r) reaches its maximum at the price cap rA =p
c 2 [r (c); r+(c)]. For c > 1=9; the equilibrium capacity k(r) reaches its maximum
at rB =
 
1 + 2
p
10c  1 =5 2 (r(c); r(c))n[r (c); r+(c)]. Interestingly, for c 2 (1=9; 1=8)
the equilibrium capacity k(r) is increasing in the interval (r (c); r+(c)); and reaches its
maximum at r(c) 2 (r+(c); r(c)):
We calculate the expected surplus. If r < r(c); then the expected surplus is S(r) = 0. If
r 2 [r (c); r+(c)], which requires c < 1=8, then the expected surplus is
S(r) =
r3
 
1 + 4r3

+ 3r2
 
c (c  2r (1  r))  r3  c3
6r3
:
If r 2 (r(c); r(c))n[r (c); r+(c)]; then the expected surplus is
S(r) =
r
2
(4  9r)  c(1 + 2r) +

c+ 2r   1
2
p
2c  r (2  5r):
And if r 2 [r(c); 1] then
S(r) =
1  6c
8
+
p
2c3
2
:
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Figure 1.8. Capacity, Expected Output and Surplus for c = 1=32:
Figure 1.8 displays the equilibrium capacity and surplus as functions of the price cap
when the unit cost of capacity is c = 1=32: The price cap that maximizes capacity is
rA =
p
2=8 whereas, consistently with Proposition 1.6, the expected surplus is maximized
at r = 1=8 < rA:
Figure 1.9 shows the graphs of the capacity, the expected output and the expected surplus
for c = 3=25: For this unit cost of capacity we have [r (c); r+(c)] = [2=10; 3=10]: (Note that
c = 3=25 < 1=8:) The price cap that maximizes capacity, expected output and expected
surplus is rB = (2
p
5+5)=25 2 (r(c); r(c)), i.e., the maximum capacity is reached at a price
cap-capacity pair in region B; and consistently with Proposition 1.6, the expected surplus
is maximal at this price cap.
Suppose that a regulator chooses the level of capacity, assuming that for each demand
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realization the entire capacity is served to the consumers that value the good the most,
in order to maximize surplus. Using the results obtained in Section 1.5 we calculate the
expected surplus as a function of the capacity as
S(k) =
k2 (k   3)
6
+
k (1  2c)
2
;
which is maximized at kW = 1 p2c:
0 1 rr*
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Figure 1.9. Capacity, Expected Output and Surplus for c = 3=25:
With capacity withholding, for c = 1=32 the optimal capacity is k(r) = (0:86) kW
and the expected surplus is S(k(r)) = (0:93)S(kW ): For c = 3=25 these numbers are
considerably lower, k(r) ' (0:61)kW and S (k(r)) = (0:81)S(kW ): These numbers
suggest that with capacity withholding price caps are more e¤ective when unit cost of
capacity is small than when it is large.
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1.7. Conclusions
In the absence of capacity precommitment, whether the demand is deterministic or sto-
chastic, price cap regulation provides an e¤ective instrument to mitigate market power and
enhance surplus: If rms produce the good with constant returns to scale, for example,
decreasing the price cap (while maintaining it above marginal cost) leads to an increase of
(expected) output and surplus, and to a decrease of the market price. Moreover, a price
cap equal to marginal cost is able to eliminate ine¢ ciencies.
With capacity precommitment and capacity withholding price cap regulation has to deal
with a trade o¤ involving the incentives for capacity investment and capacity withholding:
decreasing the price cap alleviates capacity withholding but may discourage capacity in-
vestment. As a consequence, an optimal price cap may not maximize capacity investment:
when the cost of capacity is low, maximizing the expected surplus calls for a low price
cap that alleviates capacity withholding, even at the cost of reducing capacity investment.
Moreover, under standard regularity assumptions on the demand, the comparative static
properties of price caps above the price cap that maximizes capacity are analogous to those
obtained in the case of a deterministic demand. Thus, price cap regulation provides useful
instrument to mitigate market power and enhance market e¢ ciency, although it cannot
restore e¢ ciency.
It is noteworthy that even if capacity withholding is not an issue, i.e., even if the regulator
may enforce full capacity utilization, price cap regulation does not provide appropriate
incentives for capacity investment either. In fact, both capacity investment and surplus
may be smaller with full capacity utilization than with capacity withholding. See the
example discuss in Appendix C.
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Appendix 1.A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1.3. Assume that the hazard rate of X, h () = f () =[1  F ()];
is increasing. We calculate the equilibrium capacity k(r): Let us consider rst price caps
r 2 [0; 1=2]: Then (r; ) takes values in regions A and B:
If the capacity that maximizes (r; ) is such that (r; k) 2 A; then solving the equation
(1) for MR given by (6) yields
kA(r) = F
 1(1  c
r
)  r:
Hence
kA(r) + r = F
 1(1  c
r
) < 1;
and therefore kA(r) < 1  r. If (r; kA(r)) 2 A, then r  kA(r). This inequality is equivalent
to
c  r (1  F (2r)) =MR(r; r):
Write M(r) :=MR(r; r): Di¤erentiating M yields
dM(r)
dr
= (1  F (2r))  2rf(2r) = (1  F (2r)) (1  2rh(2r)) ;
which is positive for values of r close to zero and negative for values of r close to 1=2. Since
h is increasing, then the function M(r) is strictly concave and reaches its maximum value
M on (0; 1=2): If c < M; then the equation MR(r; r) = c has two solutions on (0; 1=2),
which we denote by r (c) and r+(c) with r (c) < r+(c). In this case, for r 2 [r (c); r+(c)];
we have (r; kA(r)) 2 A: If r =2 [r (c); r+(c)], i.e., c > MR(r; r), then (r; ) decreases with
k in region A; and reaches its maximum in region B.
Assume that the capacity that maximizes (r; ) is such that (r; k) 2 B: Denote by kB(r)
the solution to equation (1) for MR given by (4). Hence kB(r) satises
0 < kB(r) < r:
(Recall that we are identifying the monopolist capacity for r < 1=2; and therefore kB(r) < r
implies kB(r) < 1  r.) The inequality kB(r) < r is equivalent to
c > MR(r; r):
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If c MR(r; r), i.e., r 2 [r (c); r+(c)]; then (r; ) increases with k in region B; and reaches
its maximum in region A. The inequality kB(r) > 0 is equivalent to
c <
Z r
0
xf(x)dx+ r (1  F (r)) =MR(r; 0);
i.e., the expected marginal revenue when output is zero MR(r; 0) must be greater than
the unit cost of capacity c. If this inequality does not hold, then (r; ) decreases with k
in region B and reaches its maximum at k = 0: Since dMR(r; 0)=dr = 1   F (r) > 0 on
(0; 1); then the function MR(; 0) has an inverse, which we denote by r: Then the condition
c < MR(r; 0) may be written as r > r(c). Since
MR(r; 0) <
Z r
0
xf(x)dx+ r (1  F (r)) = r;
then
c =MR(r(c); 0) < r(c):
Therefore the equilibrium capacity is k = 0 for a range of price caps above the cost of
capacity, r 2 (c; r(c)]. Also, since
MR(r; 0) > r (1  F (r)) > r (1  F (2r)) =MR(r; r);
then r < r(c) (i.e., c > MR(r; 0)) implies r < r (c).
Let us now consider price caps r 2 (1=2; 1]: Then (r; ) takes values in regions B and C:
Assume that the capacity that maximizes (r; ) is such that (r; k) 2 B. If r  r(c), then
(r; ) decreases with k and reaches its maximum at k = 0: If r > r(c); then (r; ) reaches
its maximum in region B if the solution to condition (1), kB(r), satises
kB(r) < 1  r:
This condition is equivalent to
c >
Z 1
2(1 r)
xf(x)dx  2 (1  r) [1  F (2 (1  r))] =MR(r; 1  r):
Note that
dMR(r; 1  r)
dr
= 2(1  F (2 (1  r))) > 0:
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Hence the function MR(r; 1  r) has an inverse on (1=2; 1) ; which we denote by r(c), and
therefore we may write the above inequality as r < r(c): If r  r(c), then (r; ) increases
with k in region B and reaches its maximum in region C. Note that for r = 1 we have
MR(r; 1 r) =MR(1; 0) = E(X). Hence, since c < E(X) by assumption, we have r(c) < 1.
Finally, assume that the capacity that maximizes (r; ) is such that (r; k) 2 C. Denote by
kC the solution to the condition (1) forMR given by equation (5). Clearly kC is independent
of the price cap r. Also, since MR(r; 1=2) = 0; then kC < 1=2 for all c 2 (0; E(X)). Since
the expected marginal revenue decreases with k; then kC > 1  r implies c < MR(r; 1  r):
Moreover, since r > 1=2 and MR is decreasing, then MR(r; 1   r) < MR(r; r): Hence kC
solves the monopolist problem if r  r(c). Otherwise, i.e., if r < r(c); then (r; ) decreases
with k in region C and reaches its maximum in region B.
As shown above c < r(c): If c < M, then we have r(c) < r (c) < r+(c) < 1=2: Since
1=2 < r(c) < 1; then
c < r(c) < r (c) < r+(c) < 1=2 < r(c) < 1:
If c M, then c MR(r; r) for all r 2 [0; 1=2], and the equilibrium capacity lies in region
B for all r 2 [0; 1=2].
Lemma 1.1. Let g be a real valued function on R, continuously di¤erentiable on some
interval (a; b); and satisfying g0(a) > 0 > g0(b); and g00(y) < 0 for all y 2 (a; b) such that
g0(y) = 0. Then g has a unique global maximizer on [a; b]; y 2 (a; b), and g0 is positive on
(a; y) and negative on (y; b):
Proof. Let y = supfy 2 (a; b) j g0(y) > 0g and y = inffy 2 (a; b) j g0(y) < 0g: Since
g0 is continuous on (a; b) ; then g0(y) = g0(y) = 0; and therefore a < y  y < b. We
show that y = y; which establishes the lemma. Suppose by way of contradiction that
y < y: Since both g00(y) and g00(y) are negative, then for " 2 (0; y   y) su¢ ciently
small
g0(y + ") < 0 < g0(y   "):
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Hence there is y 2 (y   "; y + ") satisfying g0(y) = 0, and such g0 is negative (positive)
for y below (above) and near y: Hence g00(y) > 0; which is a contradiction.
Appendix 1.B: Theorem 6 in Earle et al.
Earle et al. (2007)s Theorem 6 seemingly establishes that our propositions 1.3 to 1.6
fail for an open and dense subset of probability distributions of the demand parameter
X. Considering that Earle et al. (2007) seem to have in mind a large set of probability
distributions (their proof involves a discontinuous c.d.f.), this result is hardly surprising,
and is not inconsistent with propositions 1.3 to 1.6. (A generic continuous p.d.f. on [0; 1]
is nowhere di¤erentiable by Banach-Mazurkiewicz Theorem. Thus, the set continuously
di¤erentiable p.d.f.s with an increasing hazard rate is a meagre subset of this set.)
Nonetheless, their claim that the proof of their Theorem 4, which establishes this result
in the model of full capacity utilization, also applies to the model with capacity withholding
that we study here is incorrect. In this section we show in the example discussed in Section
1.6 perturbing the distribution of the demand parameter X as in the proof of Earle et al.
(2007)s Theorem 4 does not produce the desired results. Of course, this does not prevent
the existence of p.d.f.s on [0; 1] for which the conclusions of propositions 1.3 to 1.6 do not
hold.
Earle et al. (2007)s proof of Theorem 4 shows that given a c.d.f.F and a binding price capbr (i.e., br satises Pr(X br > k(br)) > 0; which in our setting amounts to br 2 (r(c); r(c))), and
such that dk(br)=dr < 0; then by perturbing F in a certain way one can obtain another c.d.f.
~F arbitrarily close to F and such that equilibrium capacity when the demand parameter
is distributed according to ~F , ~k satises d~k(br)=dr > 0: We show that the perturbation
used in the proof of their Theorem 4 does not produce this result when the monopolist can
withhold capacity.
Assume that X is uniformly distributed, and that the unit cost of capacity is c = 1=32:
Consider the price cap br = 2=5 2 [r (1=32); r+(1=32)] = 14   18p3; 14 + 18p3. As shown in
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Section 1.6 we have k(r) = 1  cr   r: Hence
dk(br)
dr
=
cbr2   1 =  103128 ;
i.e., capacity decreases with the price cap near br. (In the language of Earle et al. (2007),
the comparative static properties near br are standard.)
Using the results of table 1.1A, we see that for demand realizations such that X   br <
k(br); i.e., X 2 (~x; 1] where ~x = 5964 ; the monopolist withholds capacity. Let us study the
comparative static properties for a new perturbed distribution of X; denoted by ~F which
assigns probability uniformly on [0; 1] except on the interval [~x   "; ~x + "]; on which the
probability is shifted to the end points, thus creating two atoms at ~x   " and ~x + ". The
probabilities assigned to these atoms are 2" and 2(1   )"; where " and  are such that
the optimal capacity when the price cap br = 2=5 remains k(br) = 167=320; that is, " and 
are chosen in such a way that
@
@k
Z ~x
~x "
(x  br) brdF (x) + Z ~x+"
~x
brk(br)dF (x) = "br
equals
@
@k
Z ~x
~x "
(x  br) brd ~F (x) + Z ~x+"
~x
brk(br)d ~F (x) = 2 (1  ) "br:
Solving this equation yields  = 1=2, independently of ": Therefore let  = 1=2:
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Figure 1.10. Prots near r^ = 25 :
When the demand parameter is distributed according to ~F the expected prot is
~(r; k) =
Z 2r
0
x
2
2
dx+
Z k+r
2r
(x  r)rdx+
Z 1
k+r
rkdx  ck
=  r
2
k2 + [r (1  r)  c]k + r
3
6
if r + k 2 [0; ~x  "); it is
~(r; k) =
Z 2r
0
x
2
2
dx+
Z ~x "
2r
(x  r)rdx+ " ((~x  ")  r) r
+r"k +
Z 1
~x+"
rkdx  ck
= [r(1  ~x)  c]k + r
6
(3x^2   6x^r   3"2 + 4r2)
if r + k 2 [~x  "; ~x+ "]; and it is
~(r; k) =
Z 2r
0
x
2
2
dx+
Z ~x "
2r
(x  r)rdx+ " ((~x  ")  r) r
+r"k +
Z k+r
~x+"
(x  r) rdx+
Z 1
k+r
rkdx  ck
=  r
2
k2 + (r (1 + "  r)  c) k + r
3
6
  r"2 + r2"  rx^"
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if r + k > ~x+ ":
Figure 1.10 displays the graphs of the expected prot for r near br. If r > br; then
~(r; ) is increasing in capacity. If r < br, then ~(r; ) is decreasing in capacity. Hence
~k(r) = ~x   "   r if r > br; and ~k(r) = ~x + "   r if r < br for r near br. That is, the
equilibrium capacity is decreasing in the price cap. If r = br; then ~(r; ) is constant and
maximal for k 2 [~x  "  br; ~x+ "  br].
Figure 1.11 provides the graphs of k and ~k for " = 130 . Although the mapping ~k
(r)
becomes a correspondence for br, comparative statics for r near br remain standard, i.e.,
@~k(r)=@r =  1 near r = br. (Except on br itself, where the derivative is not dened since
mapping providing the equilibrium capacity becomes a correspondence.) If the monopolist
withholds capacity, after this perturbation capacity continues to decrease with the price cap
for all price caps in a neighborhood of br.
0 1 r^
1/2
k k*(r) - - - -
A
B
C
 ~  ____k*(r)
r
Figure 1.11. Equilibrium Capacity for F and ~F .
Thus, Earle et al. (2007)s proof, which relies on this perturbation, does not apply to a
model where the monopolist may withhold capacity. In fact, this perturbation has an e¤ect
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on the monopolist prot and the prot maximizing level of capacity akin to that of creating
a at spot on the demand when the demand is known with certainty.
Appendix 1.C: Full Capacity Utilization
Assume that the monopolist cannot withhold capacity, i.e., must supply its entire capacity
for each demand realization. One may interpret this setting as one where the monopolist
delivers its output to the market before the demand is realized. This model is studied by
Earle et al. (2007) and Grim and Zoettl (2010). We show that the equilibrium and the
comparative static properties of price caps in this model are signicant di¤erent from those
of our model where the monopolist may withhold capacity.
Monopoly Equilibrium with a Price Cap
Assume that a regulatory agency imposes a price cap r 2 [0; 1]. Table 1.3A identies the
market equilibrium price for each demand realization if the monopolist installs a capacity
k < 1  r (and supplies it inelastically to the market).
X [0; k) [k; r + k) [r + k; 1]
P^ (r; k; x) 0 x  k r
Table 1.3A: Equilibrium Price for k 2 [0; 1  r).
Table 1.3B identies the market equilibrium price for each demand realization when the
monopolist installs a capacity k  1  r.
X [0; k) [k; 1]
P^ (r; k; x) 0 x  k
Table 1.3B: Equilibrium Price for k 2 [1  r; 1].
Note that if k  1  r the price cap is non-binding.
49
For k < 1  r the expected price is
E(P^ (r; k;X)) =
Z r+k
k
(x  k) f(x)dx+
Z 1
r+k
rf(x)dx:
Hence
@E(P^ (r; k;X))
@k
=  
Z r+k
k
f(x)dx;
and
@2E(P^ (r; k;X))
@k2
= f(k)  f(r + k):
For k  1  r the expected price is
E(P^ (r; k;X)) =
Z 1
k
(x  k)f(x)dx:
Hence
@E(P^ (r; k;X))
@k
=  
Z 1
k
f(x)dx;
and
@2E(P^ (r; k;X))
@k2
= f(k):
The monopolist chooses the level of capacity k in order to maximize its expected prot
^(r; k) = E

[P^ (r; k;X)  c]k

= [E(P^ (r; k;X))  c]k;
Clearly ^ is continuous on [0; 1]2. In an interior equilibrium k solves
@E(P^ (r; k;X))
@k
k + E(P^ (r; k;X)) = c; (13)
and satises
@2^(r; k)
@k2
=
@2E(P^ (r; k;X))
@k2
k + 2
@E(P^ (r; k;X))
@k
< 0: (14)
We have
@2^(r; k)
@k2
=  k(f(r + k)  f(k))  2(F (r + k)  F (k)):
for k < 1  r; and
@2^(r; k)
@k2
= kf(k)  2 (1  F (k)) :
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for k  1  r. The sign of these expressions is ambiguous. In fact, it is not di¢ cult to nd
examples for which the prot function ^(r; ) is not concave for some values of r. (E.g.,
take f(x) = 2 (1  x) and r = 1=4.) This property of this model of full capacity utilization
stands in contrast with that of our model of capacity withholding, in which the expected
prot is a concave function.
In this setting, the surplus realized is independent of r: Assuming e¢ cient rationing, the
expected surplus is
S^(k) =
Z k
0
x2
2
dx+
Z 1
k
1
2
k (2x  k) dx = 1
6
k
 
k2   3k + 3 :
An Example: The Uniform Distribution
Assume that X is uniformly distributed and c 2 (0; 1=2): For k < 1  r we have
E(P^ (r; k;X)) =
1
2
r (2  2k   r) ;
and for k  1  r, we have
E(P^ (r; k;X)) =
1
2
(1  k)2 :
Hence for k < 1  r; we have
@2^(r; k)
@k2
=  2r:
and for k  1  r, we have
@2^(r; k)
@k2
=  2 + 3k:
If the equilibrium capacity is k < 1  r; then equation (13) is
 rk + 1
2
r (2  2k   r) = c:
Solving this equation we get
k1(r) =
1
2

1  c
r
  r
2

:
Hence k1(r) is the solution to the monopolist problem provided 0 < k1(r) < 1  r; i.e.,
r(c) := 1 p1  2c < r < 1
3
p
6c+ 1 +
1
3
:= r(c):
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If r < r(c); then expected prot decreases with k and the equilibrium capacity is k = 0: If
r > r(r); then expected prot increases with k at k = 1  r:
If the equilibrium capacity is k  1  r; then equation (13) is
  (1  k) k + 1
2
(1  k)2 = c:
Solving this equation we get
k2 =
2 p1 + 6c
3
:
Note that k2 > 0 for all c 2 (0; 1=2): Hence k2 is the solution to the monopolist problem
provided k2  1   r, i.e., r  r(c): If r < r(c) the expected prot decreases with k at
k = 1  r:
The equilibrium capacity is therefore given by
k^ (r) =
8>>><>>>:
0 if r  [0; r (c)];
k1 (r) if r 2 (r(c); r(c));
k2 if r > [r(c); 1]:
The maximum capacity is installed for r solving
dk1(r)
dr
=
1
2

c
r2
  1
2

= 0;
i.e., r =
p
2c: (Note that d2k1(r)=dr2 =  c=r3 < 0:) The maximum capacity is
k1(r
) =
1
2
 
r
c
2
> k2:
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Figure 1.12. Capacity Investment and Surplus with and without Withholding.
As shown in Section 1.6 the optimal capacity is kW = 1   p2c = 2k1(r): Hence r is
indeed the optimal price cap. Moreover, since k^(r) > k2; then a binding price increases
expected surplus, but is unable to provide incentives for the monopolist to install the optimal
level of capacity. A price cap is a poor regulatory instrument also in this framework. In
fact, price caps generate a lower expected surplus (and provide worse incentives for capacity
investment) under full capacity utilization that when the monopolist can withhold capacity
as Figure 1.12 below shows. (Note that S(k(r(c))) is a lower bound to the maximum
expected surplus that can be realized with an optimal price cap.)
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CHAPTER 2. STRATEGIC INCENTIVES FOR KEEPING ONE SET OF
BOOKS UNDER THE ARMS LENGTH PRINCIPLE
2.1. Introduction
Policy makers have become increasingly aware of the possible use of transfer prices as a
device for shifting prots into low tax jurisdictions. Transfer pricing policies also have im-
portant implications since exports and imports from related parties are a dominant portion
of trade ows see Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2009). To moderate the incentives for rms
to use transfer prices to shift prots from high to low tax jurisdictions for reasons unrelated
to the economic nature of the transactions, most governments follow taxation policies that
are based on the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax
Administrations, which recommend that, for tax purposes, internal pricing policies be con-
sistent with the Arms Length Principle (ALP); i.e., that transfer prices between companies
of multinational enterprises for tax purposes be established on a market value basis, thus
comparable to transactions between independent (unrelated) parties -see OECD (2010).
Transfer prices serve both the purpose of allocating costs to di¤erent subsidiaries and for
determining the tax liability of parent rms and subsidiaries. Since using a single trans-
fer price to do this double purpose can distort internal transactions, a growing number of
multinational rms use internal transfer prices that di¤er from those used for tax purposes.
This is a legal practice in OECD countries, the only constraint is that being transfer prices
for tax purposes must be consistent with the ALP. Given that there is no statutory re-
quirement, incentive and tax transfer prices may di¤er. Therefore, an immediate question
is whether rms separate their internal transfer prices from those used for tax purposes.
Using the terminology of Hyde and Choe (2005) and Dürr and Göx (2011), when rms
use the same transfer price for tax reporting and for providing incentives, they keep one set
of books, while when rms use di¤erent transfer prices for each purpose, they keep two sets
of books.
In the absence of delegation, the choice between keeping one or two sets of books is not
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a matter. However under delegation, the choice between keeping one or two sets of books
is relevant, even if tax rates are equal across jurisdictions.
Theoretical studies regarding the optimal accounting strategy by decentralized rms
which comply with tax rules are not conclusive. Specically, these results depend on con-
sidering the presence of competition.
First, abstracting from competition consideration, theoretical literature on this topic has
established that keeping two sets of books is optimal whenever tax and incentives objectives
are conicting -see Baldenius, Melumad and Reichelstein (2004).
Second, considering the possibility of competition, Göx (2000) and Dürr and Göx (2011)
study the equilibrium accounting and transfer pricing policies in a multinational duopoly
with price competition in the nal good market. They nd that the rms in a duopoly can
benet from strategically using the same transfer price for tax and managerial purposes
instead of using separate transfer prices for both objectives. According to their results,
rms in industries with a small number of competitors can benet from using the same
transfer price for tax and managerial purposes even if the tax and managerial objectives
are conicting. Therefore if rms keep one set of books, the ALP may reinforce the e¤ect
of vertical separation by softening competition see Vickers (1985), Fershtman and Judd
(1987), Sklivas (1987), Alles and Datar (1998).
Empirical evidence on the use of alternative accounting system is also mixedsee Dürr
and Göx (2011) for a review of this literature.
In this paper, taking compliance with the tax rules as given (i.e., transfer prices for
tax purposes are consistent with the ALP); we study the optimal accounting strategy by
decentralized multinational rms which compete in quantities in a context of imperfect
competition.12
As Göx (2000), Arya and Mittendorf (2008) and Dürr and Göx (2011), we consider ac-
counting policy a commitment device since changing it is associated with high administrative
12Quantity competition provides a reduced form model for the analysis of more complex forms of imperfect
competition; e.g., capacity choice followed by some kind of price competition -see Kreps and Scheinkman
(1983) and Moreno and Ubeda (2006).
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and consulting costs. Moreover, accounting policies tend to be public (in, for instance, man-
agement discussions in annual reports, Securities and Exchange Commission lings and tax
authority pricing agreements). For these reasons, choice of a accounting policy may be a
publicly observable commitment.
Other means of competitive commitment have been detailed in the literature, including
distorting managerial compensation -Fershtman and Judd (1987); Sklivas (1987)-, sinking
capacity investments -Dixit (1980); Spence (1977)-, building inventories -Ware (1985)-,
limiting information acquisition -Einy et al. (2002); Gal-Or (1988)-, and cost allocation
rules -Gal-Or (1993); Hughes and Kao (1998).
In our framework there are two markets, which we refer to as the Latin market (or
home market) and the Greek market (or external market). There are two rms engaging
in Cournot competition in the Latin market. These rms have subsidiaries, which in turn
engage in Cournot competition in the Greek market. As customary, we assume that par-
ents maximize consolidated prots, while subsidiaries maximize their own prots. Since
competition in the Latin market provides a market price to impose on comparable market
transactions, parents use this price to satisfy both cost and tax accounting requirements
if keeping one set of books. If parents keep two sets of books, Latin market provides a
market price only for tax purposes. Specically, the analysis is based on a three stage non-
cooperative game under complete information. Parents choose their accounting policy and
then compete in quantities in the home market and set the prices at which they sell the
good to their subsidiaries (either directly or indirectly via their output choices), which in
turn compete in quantities in an external market. The decisions of the subsidiaries in the
third stage are solely determined by the outcome of the second stage game. We show that
parentsaccounting policies determine the properties of market outcomes. Before charac-
terizing equilibria of this game, we analyze the properties of each subgame (i.e., when both
rms keep one set of books, when both rms keep two sets of books, as well when one rm
keeps one set of books and the other keeps two sets of books).
In the subgame where both parents adopt one set of books (i.e., a parent must transfer the
good to its subsidiary at the home market price), parents output decisions must internalize
59
its impact on the transfer price of its subsidiary, and its subsidiarys rival. One set of books
thus provides parents with an instrument to soften competition in the external market.
Since a parent inuences its transfer price via its output decision in the home market,
competition may be more aggressive in this market. Total prots under one set of books
are above prots at the equilibrium where parents and subsidiaries are integrated. Hence
using one set of books may provide a rationale for vertical separation. If tax rates are equal
across jurisdictions, maximizing gross or net prots leads to the same result. However, if
tax rates are di¤erent across jurisdictions, using one set of books also provides tax saving.
In particular, when the home market is a tax heaven, the quantity in the home market is
cut in order to increase the transfer price and therefore, every additional unit sold in the
external market at a higher transfer price reduces the rms tax liabilities.
In the subgame where both parents adopt two sets of books (i.e., parent rms use internal
transfer price that di¤ers from that used for tax purposes), internal transfer prices open
up the possibility to gain a Stackelberg advantage in the external market. Parents reduce
their internal transfer prices below marginal cost in order to take advantage in the external
market, creating a sort of prisoners dilemma. If tax rates are equal across jurisdictions,
maximizing gross or net prots lead to a di¤erent result: a parent has an incentive to reduce
the market price in the home market by increasing its output and at the same time reduces
its internal transfer price, thus increasing its subsidiarys rival tax liability without a¤ecting
the marginal cost of its own subsidiary. Therefore, if both rms keep two sets of books
together with a transfer pricing regulation consistent with the ALP competition intensies in
both markets relative to an equilibrium where parents and subsidiaries are integrated. Thus
if tax rates are equal across jurisdictions, neither benets from competition consideration
nor tax liabilities savings exist when parents use two sets of books. Nevertheless if tax rates
are di¤erent across jurisdictions, two sets of books may reduce tax liabilities.
In the subgame with asymmetric accounting policies (i.e., one parent choosing one set
of books and the other parent choosing two sets of books), the parent using two sets of
books becomes the dominant producer in the external market, since its internal transfer
price is lower than home market price, while the parent using one set of books becomes
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the dominant producer in the home market because increasing its output in this market
alleviates the double marginalization that arises in the external market. Total output (total
prots) in both markets are above (below) the standard Cournot level. But prots of the
parent using two sets of books exceed this level.
Adding the rst stage to the game, whereby parents choose their accounting policy, leads
to a variety of equilibrium depending on market sizes and tax rates. Restricting attention
to (pure strategy) subgame perfect equilibria, the possible types of the game vary from a
prisonersdilemma (with a unique Pareto ine¢ cient Nash equilibrium in which both parents
choose two sets of books) to a game of chicken (with two pure strategy Nash equilibria, in
which one rm uses one set of books and the other uses two sets of books) or a coordination
game (with two pure strategy Nash equilibria, one in which both parents choose two sets of
books, and another one in which choose one set of books). Also, parameter constellations
of market sizes and tax rates can be found such the type of the game is a cooperation game
(with a unique Pareto e¢ cient Nash equilibrium in which both parents choose one set of
books).
Parents strategic behavior implies that keeping one set of books may be sustained as
an equilibrium for most of the size di¤erences between markets, when tax rates are high.
Moreover, this equilibrium is unique when both markets are similar in size.
Our analysis contributes to the transfer pricing literature by broadening the understand-
ing of the potential incentives for the choice of the accounting policy. A central premise
in some related literature is that multinational rms set the same transfer price for tax
and incentive purposes (i.e., keeping one set of books) see Schjelderup and Sorgard (1997),
Korn and Lengsfeld (2007), Nielsen et al. (2008) and Lemus and Moreno (2011). In these
papers one set of books is taken as given and is not a matter of choice. Here we endogenize
that choice and show that one set of books may be sustained as an equilibrium under broad
conditions.
Since keeping one set of books provides parents with an instrument to soften competition
in the external market, our analysis o¤ers a convincing explanation of how the choice of the
accounting policy can serve as a precommitment device. In our setting, taxes commit rms
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to the adoption of a particular accounting policy (i.e., one or two sets of books).13
In addition, our model contributes to the literature on strategic delegation by broadening
the understanding of the potential benets of decentralization, an organizational structure
whose motivation is not well understood when rms compete in quantities. Dürr and Göx
(2011) analyzed the optimal accounting when rms compete in prices. Their results reinforce
the e¤ect of vertical separation in softening competition when rms keep one set of books.
Analogous conclusions, when rms compete in prices, were found by Sklivas (1987).
Our analysis does not only broaden the theoretical understanding but it also provides
testable empirical predictions depending on the di¤erences in market size and tax rates.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the basic setup. Section 2.3
provides an equilibrium analysis under one set of books. Section 2.4 derives results for
two sets of books. Section 2.5 studies the equilibrium with asymmetric accounting policies.
Section 2.6 characterizes the equilibria of this three stage non-cooperative game. Section
2.7 concludes.
2.2. Model and Preliminaries
A good is sold in two markets, which we refer to as the Latin market and the Greek market.
The inverse demands in the Latin and Greek markets are pd(q) = max f0; 1  bqg and
d() = max f0; 1  g, respectively, where b and  are positive real numbers. Assuming
that demands are linear facilitates the analysis and makes it easier to interpret the results.
13Arya and Mittendorf (2008) analyze market based transfer pricing as a strategic response in a similar
setting. They show that the ALP makes rms more aware of the fact that excessive home market prices
depress external production (i.e., the concern is about double marginalization) and may be more aggressive in
the home market as a result. However, they do not recognize that ALP increases the prevailing transfer prices
and thereby mitigate the prisoners dilemma in transfer pricing to get an edge in downstream competition. In
their model, parents rely on intracompany discounts to manage tensions between the home and the external
markets. Intracompany discounts are set prior to the stage of competition in the home market and serve as
a precommitment device. Nevertheless, this device is somewhat contrived since parents must credibly bind
themselves to these discounts.
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We assume that maximum willingness to pay in each market is equal.14 Di¤erences in the
slope of the demands (i.e., of the parameters b and ) capture the impact of di¤erences in
the market size the demand is greater the smaller the slope. The parameter s := b= is a
proxy for the size of Latin market relative to that of the Greek market.15
The taxable income in the Latin and Greek markets is determined by this tax  and +,
respectively. The parameter  is the di¤erential tax rates of the Greek relative to the Latin
market. Tax rates are assumed to be less than 1, reecting the idea that policy makers are
unable or unwilling to tax multinational rms with a 100 per cent prot taxation.16 When
 > 0 ( < 0), the Latin (Greek) market is a tax heaven.
There are two rms producing the good at same constant marginal cost, which is assumed
to be zero without loss of generality. Firms engage in Cournot competition in the Latin
market, and have subsidiaries which in turn engage in Cournot competition in the Greek
market.
We assume throughout that for tax purposes transfer prices must be consistent with the
ALP; i.e., that the taxable income of a subsidiary that produces i is ( p)i, where  and
p are the market prices in the Greek and Latin markets, respectively. Under this assumption
the consolidated prots of rm i as a function of parentsand subsidiariesoutputs is
i(q1; q2;1;2) = (2.1)
= (1  ) pd(q1 + q2)qi + (1    ) d (1 + 2)i +pd(q1 + q2)i:
We refer to the case where parents use the same transfer prices for internal and tax
purposes as keeping one set of books. If a parent rm uses an internal transfer price that
di¤ers from that used for tax purposes, its subsidiary receives the good at a transfer price
14Lemus and Moreno (2011) provide an equilibrium analysis when rms use one set of books, in which
willingness to pay in each market are di¤erent.
15This assumption about willingness to pay holds if preferences over the good and/or range of income per
capita are similar in the Latin market and in the Greek market. As regards market sizes,  > b occurs if
the number of people demanding the good in the Latin market is larger than in the Greek market.
16Dynamic allocative distortions associated with taxations (100 per cent prot taxation removes all in-
centive to do one thing rather than another) place constraints on prot taxation.
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ti (which is a non market based transfer prices) but the taxable incomes of the parent and
subsidiary are determined by p. We refer to this case as keeping two sets of books.
Parent rms seek to maximize after tax consolidated prots, independently of whether
they keep one or two sets of books; since the cost of production is zero, the consolidated
prots are just the sum of the after tax revenues of the parent and the subsidiary. A
subsidiary maximizes its own prots, which is the di¤erence, after tax, between its revenue
and its cost. A subsidiaryunit cost is just its transfer price. We identify a parent and its
subsidiary rm with the same subindex i 2 f1; 2g.
We suppose that both parents must make a publicly observable commitment to an ac-
counting policy before competing in the Latin market and determining their transfer prices.
After deciding on the choice of the accounting policies the parents compete in quantities in
the Latin market and compute the transfer prices according to the accounting policy and
communicate them to their subsidiaries.17 Finally, the subsidiaries compete in quantities in
the Greek market. Thus, we consider a three-stage game consisting of the accounting policy
choice on stage one, quantities in the Latin market and the well-known transfer pricing on
stage two and nally, quantities in the Greek market on stage three.
In the absence of delegation, the choice between keeping one or two sets of books is not
a matter. If parents do not delegate but rather compete in quantities also in the Greek
market, the equilibrium outcome in both markets is independent of type of accounting.18
In particular, if tax rates in both markets are identical, the equilibrium outcome is just the
Cournot outcome in both markets.
In the Cournot equilibrium of a duopoly where the market demand is P d(Q) = maxf0,1 
BQg, rmsconstant marginal costs are (c1; c2) 2 R2+ and the taxable income is determined
by this tax  , the market price PC , the output QCi and prots 
C
i of rm i are
(PC ; QCi ;
C
i ) =
 
1 + c1 + c2
3
;
1  2ci + c3 i
3B
;
(1  ) (1  2c1 + c2)2
9B
!
: (2.2)
17Since the outcome of the rst stage game becomes known before the market stage of the game, sub-
sidiaries can infer the corresponding internal transfer prices from the other rms accounting policy and
perfectly predict the internal transfer price even if it is not observable per se -see Göx (2000).
18Hyde and Choe (2005) observe this fact in a monopoly setting.
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If the market is monopolized by a single rm whose constant marginal cost is c 2 R+,
then the market equilibrium price PM , output QM , and the rms prots M are
(PM ; QM ;M ) =
 
1 + c
2
;
1  c
2B
;
(1  ) (1  c)2
4B
!
: (2.3)
Using these formulae (2.2), we readily calculate the Latins market Cournot equilibrium
price pC , output qCi = q
C and prots Ci = 
C
L of rm i as
(pC ; qC ;CL ) =

1
3
;
1
3b
;
1  
9b

: (2.4)
Using the formulae (2.3), we obtain the monopoly equilibrium price, output, and the
monopolys prots in the Latin market as
(pM ; qM ;ML ) =

1
2
;
1
2b
;
1  
4b

: (2.5)
When aggregate output is q, the total surplus generated in the market is given by
S(q) =

1  Bq
2

q: (2.6)
In the Latin market, the surplus at the Cournot equilibrium, SCL , is therefore
SCL =
4
9b
; (2.7)
and the surplus at monopoly equilibria, SML , is
SML =
3
8b
: (2.8)
Replacing b with  yields formulas analogous for the Cournot and monopoly equilibria in
the Greek market. (These formulas assume that rmsconstant marginal cost of production
is zero). We use the notation C , C , CG, S
C
G , and 
M , M , MG , S
M
G , for the values
of output, price, prots and surplus at the Cournot duopoly equilibrium, and monopoly
equilibrium of the market, respectively.
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2.3. One Set of Books
In this section, we assume that parents use the market price in the Latin market as the
transfer price per intrarm transaction, i.e., parents keep only one set of books to satisfy
both cost and tax accounting requirements. Of course, this internal pricing scheme is consist
with the ALP. We identify the subgame perfect equilibria (SPE henceforth) of the game.
In this setup, parents act as leadersanticipating the reactions of subsidiary rms.
Assuming that the price in the Latin market is p  0, each subsidiary i 2 f1; 2g chooses
its output i to solve
max
i2R+
(1    ) (d (1 + 2)  p)i:
Here p is the constant marginal cost of the subsidiary rms.19 Using the formulae (2.2), we
calculate the equilibrium outputs and price for p  0 as
1 = 

2 = ^(p) =
1  p
3
:
(Note that in the game played by subsidiaries the equilibrium is unique.) The equilibrium
outcome depends only on p, but do not depend directly on the tax rate in the Greek market
( +).
Therefore, the equilibrium price in the Greek market is
 = d (2^(p)) =
1 + 2p
3
:
A SPE of the game is prole of actions for parents 1 and 2, (q1; q2), and a pair of
functions describing the subsidiaries strategies (f1 (q1; q2) ; f2 (q1; q2)) such that parents
maximize consolidated prots and subsidiaries maximize their own prots. Then in a SPE
the subsidiariesstrategies are fi (q

1; q

2) = ^i(p
d(q1; q2)) for i 2 f1; 2g, and parents, antici-
pating that subsidiariesreactions are described by (^1; ^2), choose their actions in order to
maximize consolidated prots (Oi ). Thus, Parent i chooses its output qi in order to solve
max
qi2R+
Oi (q1; q2);
19Dürr and Göx (2011) assume that rms can arbitrarily choose a transfer price from an allowable exoge-
nous range of ALP prices, withstanding a possible examination of authorities in the two markets.
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where
Oi (q1; q2) = i(q1; q2; ^1

pd(q1 + q2)

; ^2

pd(q1 + q2)

);
continue to be the same formula as given by (2.1).
The rst-order condition for prot maximizing is
@Oi
@qi
= (1  )

dpd
dq
qi + p
d

+ (1  ) dp
d
dq

@^
@p
^i +
@^i
@p
^

+ (2.9)
+
dpd
dq

^i

1  @^
@p

+
@^i
@p
(^  p)

= 0:
The expression in (2.9) comprises three di¤erent terms. In what follows, we refer to
rst term as Cournot marginal revenue, to second term as competition e¤ect20 and to the
last term as tax e¤ect21. Competition e¤ect is a consequence of vertical separation (i.e.,
delegation).
In the absence of delegation and taxation, the optimal quantity in each market is found
by equating Cournot marginal revenue with marginal cost (which in the model is zero). In
particular, the equilibrium in both markets is just Cournot output.
The sign of competition e¤ect depends on the price level in the Latin market and the
sign of tax e¤ect depends on the sign of :
For pd > 34p
C , the inuence that competition e¤ect has on the marginal prots of parent
i is positive from
(1  ) dp
d
dq

@^
@p
^i +
@^i
@p
^

= (1  ) 4s
9

pd   3
4
pC

;
in (2.9), so that the optimal quantity in this market, ceteris paribus, is above the Cournot
output. Intuitively, this quantity increase is favorable because it reduces the Latin market
20Since Latin market price are observable, a parent takes into account that it can inuence this price
via its output decision in the Latin market. Thus, rms can use Latin market price strategically to a¤ect
output decisions for the external market. In this setting, a high Latin market price can be used to reduce
the competition in the external market.
21 If tax rates di¤er among jurisdiction, rms want to shift prots into the low tax jurisdictions by use of
distorted transfer prices.
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price and therefore, alleviates the double marginalization problem. Nevertheless, double
marginalization problem remains (i.e., pd > 0). By charging transfer prices above marginal
cost (zero in this model) both parents can commit their subsidiaries to behave as softer
competitors on the nal product market. In this setting, a parent takes into account that
it can inuence its transfer price only via its output decision in the Latin market. Hence, a
parents output decision must internalize its impact on the transfer price of its subsidiary,
and its subsidiarys rival. Therefore one set of books provides parents with an instrument
to soften competition in the external market.
For  > 0 the inuence that tax e¤ect has on the marginal prots of parent i is negative
from

dpd
dq

^i

1  @^
@p

+
@^i
@p
(^  p)

=  2s
9


1  pd

;
in (2.9), so that the optimal output in this market, ceteris paribus, is lower than output in
a setting without taxes (or with equal tax rates between markets). Intuitively, this quantity
reduction is favorable because it increases the transfer price and every additional unit that
is sold in the Greek market at a higher transfer price reduces the subsidiarys tax liabilities.
For  > 0 the inuence that tax e¤ect has on the marginal prots of subsidiary i is also
negative. Intuitively, increasing p, given that tax e¤ect in the Latin market is negative, acts
as a marginal cost increase for subsidiaries. The opposite holds for  < 0.
Solving the system of equations formed by the rst-order condition of parents 1 and 2,
we obtain their outputs
q1 = q

2 =
(1  ) (3b+ 9)
b ((1  ) (8b+ 27) + 4b) := q
O: (2.10)
The equilibrium price in the Latin market is
pd(2qO) =
(1  ) (2b+ 9) + 4b
(1  ) (8b+ 27) + 4b := p
O:
Substituting the value of p into equations ^i(p) and ^(p) above, we obtain the subsidiaries
outputs,
1 = 

2 = ^(p
O) =
(1  ) (2b+ 6)
 ((1  ) (8b+ 27) + 4b) := 
O; (2.11)
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and the equilibrium price in the Greek market,
d(2O) =
(1  ) (4b+ 15) + 4b
(1  ) (8b+ 27) + 4b := 
O:
Note that if the taxes di¤erential was zero (i.e.,  = 0), this outcome would also be
optimal in a setting without taxes and maximizing the gross or net prots leads to the same
result. For  > 0, the output in both markets decreases with . The opposite e¤ect applies
to the equilibrium quantity for  < 0. Since prices in the Latin market increase with ,
parents save on tax payments by using one set of books.
In particular, if  = 0 and using (2.4) we can rewrite the expression for rmsoutput in
the Latin market (2.10) as
qO = qC +
1
3 (8b+ 27)
:
Likewise, using the equation (2.5) we can write the expression for rmsoutput in the Greek
market (2.11) as
O =
M
2
  3
4 (8b+ 27)
:
Thus, the output in the Latin market is above the Cournot output and the output in the
Greek market is below the Cournot output. Note also that double marginalization imposed
by ALP leads to an output in the Greek market that is below the monopoly output.
We have
@qO
@
=   9
(8b+ 27)2
< 0;
and
@O
@b
=
6
(8b+ 27)2
> 0:
The output in the Latin (Greek) market decreases (increases) with  (b). It is worthwhile
responding to an increase of the Greek market size (i.e., a smaller ) with an increase of the
output in the Latin market, thus reducing the transfer price (in order to alleviate the double
marginalization problem) and avoiding a large reduction of the sales of the subsidiary.
The equilibrium output in the Latin market also satises
lim
!0
qO = qC +
1
24b
:= qO0 ;
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and
lim
!1
qO = qC :
Thus, as the size of the Greek market becomes large (i.e.,  becomes small), the output in
the Latin market is above the Cournot output. Parentsincentives to increase their output
in order to alleviate double marginalization remain as the size of the Greek market becomes
arbitrarily large. Of course, as the size of the Greek market becomes arbitrarily small (i.e.,
 approaches innity), parents tend to ignore the double marginalization problem (as the
prots in this market become negligible), and focus on the impact on their output decision
on the Latin market, and their output approaches the Cournot output.
The equilibrium output in the Greek market satises
lim
b!1
O =
M
2
;
and
lim
b!0
O = C   1
9
=
M
2
  1
36
:= O0 :
Thus, as the size of the Latin market becomes arbitrarily small (i.e., b approaches innity),
the revenues in this market become negligible, and parentsoutput decisions mainly serve
the purpose of committing to high prices in the Greek market.
Interestingly, keeping one set of books (i.e., internal transfer prices are consistent with
the ALP) allows parents to attain perfect cooperation (i.e., they are able to sustain the
monopoly outcome) when b approaches innity. In this case, ALP is merely an instrument
to avoid competition in the Greek market. When the size of the Latin market becomes
arbitrarily large (i.e., b approaches zero), however, revenues mainly come from the Latin
market and therefore, parents tend to ignore the impact of double marginalization in the
Greek market, producing the Cournot output in the Latin market. Double marginalization
leads to an output in the Greek market that is below the monopoly output.
Let us study the total prots and total surplus under one set of books. Total prots can
be calculated using (2.1) and (2.4) as
O = OL +
O
G = 
C
L +
C
G +
2 (1  )
9
4s2 + 22s+ 27
 (8s+ 27)2
; (2.12)
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and the total surplus can be calculated using (2.6) and (2.7) as
SOL + S
O
G = S
C
L + S
C
G  
2
9
20s2 + 155s+ 297
 (8s+ 27)2
:
We summarize these results in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.1. If both rms use one set of books and  = 0, then in a SPE:
(2.1.1) The output in the Latin market qO is above the Cournot outcome, and increases
with the size of the Greek market , i.e.,
qO > qC and
@qO
@
< 0;
and the output in the Greek market O is below the Cournot outcome, and decreases with
the size of the Latin market b, i.e.,
O < C and
@O
@b
> 0:
Further, as  becomes large qO approaches qC , and as  becomes small qO approaches qO0 ,
where qO0 > q
C . And as b becomes large O approaches M=2, and as b becomes small O
approaches O0 < 
C , where O0 < 
M=2.
(2.1.2) The total prots are above the total prots at the Cournot equilibrium.
(2.1.3) The total surplus is below the total surplus at the Cournot equilibrium.
Keeping one set of books provides parent rms with an instrument to limit aggressive
competition in the Greek market, and may allow them to encourage an outcome near the
monopoly outcome when the size of the Greek market relative to that of the Latin market
is large.22 Of course, since a parent inuences its transfer price only via its output decision
in the Latin market, competition in this market is more aggressive and the output is above
the Cournot output. Nevertheless, total prots are above at the Cournot prots. Thus, this
22Choe and Matsushima (2013) examine the e¤ect of ALP on dynamic competition in imperfectly com-
petitive markets and show that the ALP results in more stable tacit collusion. They consider a vertically
related market with two upstream rms which supply to their downstream a¢ liates and other unrelated
buyers in the downstream market. The authors consider the price the upstream rms charge to unrelated
buyers as the comparable uncontrolled price for applying the ALP. In our setting, the price in the home
market provides a reliable measure of an arms length result.
71
accounting policy may provide a rationale for vertical separation. However, total surplus is
below the surplus at the Cournot equilibrium, which raises some questions about the use of
the ALP as a guideline for regulating transfer prices.
2.4. Two Sets of Books
We consider next the case where each parent uses two sets of books together with a
transfer pricing regulation consistent with the ALP. In this scenario, subsidiary is taxable
income is (d (1 + 2)   p)i, where p is the price in the Latin market, whereas its gross
prots are
 
d (1 + 2)  ti

i, where ti is the internal transfer price that parent i uses
to allocate costs. Parent is consolidated net prots as a function of the outputs of parents
and subsidiaries continue to be the same formula as given by (2.1), i(q1,q2,1,2). We
identify the subgame perfect equilibria (SPE henceforth) of the game as follows.
Assuming that the price in the Latin market is p 2 R+ and internal transfer prices are
(t1; t2) 2 R, each subsidiary i 2 f1; 2g chooses its output i to solve
max
i2R+

d (1 + 2)  ti

i   ( +) (d (1 + 2)  p)i:
Solving the system of equations formed by the rst-order condition of subsidiaries 1 and 2,
we calculate their equilibrium outputs as
1 = 

2 = ~1(p; t1; t2) = ~2(p; t1; t2) =
1    + ( +) p  2ti + t3 i
3 (1    ) :
(Note that in the game played by subsidiaries the equilibrium is unique.) The outcome in
the Greek market depends on p, ti and  +: Therefore, the outcome depends on tax rate
in the Greek market even if tax rates in both markets are identical; i.e.,  = 0.
Assuming that ~1(p; t1; t2) + ~2(p; t1; t1)  1 , the market price is
~(p; t1; t2) = 
d(~1(p; t1; t2) + ~2(p; t1; t2))
=
1      2 ( +) p+ t1 + t2
3 (1    ) :
A SPE of the game is prole of actions for parents 1 and 2, (q1; q2; t1; t2), and a pair of
functions describing the subsidiariesstrategies (f1 (q1; q2; t1; t2) ; f2 (q1; q2; t1; t2)) such that
72
parents maximize consolidated prots and subsidiaries maximize their own prots. Then
in a SPE the subsidiariesstrategies are
fi (q

1; q

2; t

1; t

2) = ~i(p
d(q1; q

2); t

1; t

2) for i 2 f1; 2g;
and parents, anticipating that subsidiariesreactions are described by (~1; ~2), choose their
actions in order to maximize consolidated prots (Ti ). Thus, Parent i chooses its output
qi and its internal transfer price ti in order to solve
max
(ti;qi)2RR+
Ti (q1; q2; t1; t2);
where
Ti (q1; q2; t1; t2) = i(q1; q2; ~1(p
d(q1 + q2); t1; t2); ~2(p
d(q1 + q2); t1; t2)):
Parent is rst-order conditions for prot maximization are
@Ti
@ti
= (1    )

@~
@ti
~i +
@~i
@ti
~

+

@~i
@ti
p

= 0; (2.13)
and
@Ti
@qi
= (1  )

p+
dpd
dq
qi

+ (1  ) dp
d
dq

@~
@p
~i +
@~i
@p
~

+
+
dpd
dq

~i

1  @~
@p

+
@~i
@p
(~  p)

= 0: (2.14)
The expression in (2.13) comprises two di¤erent terms. Using the same terminology as
before, we refer to the rst term as the competition e¤ect on the internal transfer price ti23
and to the second term as tax e¤ect on the internal transfer price ti.
The sign of competition e¤ect on the internal transfer price depends on the output level
in the Greek market and the sign of tax e¤ect on the internal transfer price depends on the
sign of :
23Parent can use the internal transfer prices strategically to impact output decisions for the external
market. In this setting, a low transfer price can be used to expand own market share in the external market.
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For ~i <
6
5
C the inuence that the competition e¤ect has on the marginal prots of
parent i is negative from
(1    )

@~
@ti
~i +
@~i
@ti
~

=
5
3

~i  
6
5
C

;
in (2.13), so that the internal transfer price ti, ceteris paribus, is lower than the marginal
cost (zero in this model).24 Note ti is the constant marginal cost of the subsidiary rm. In-
tuitively, the internal transfer price ti is lower than the marginal cost in order to render each
subsidiary into a low cost competitor that behaves aggressively by increasing its quantity.
The transfer price that optimizes managerial incentives ti (which is a non market transfer
pricing) opens up the possibility to gain a Stackelberg advantage in the Greek market. By
reducing its internal transfer price below marginal cost, parents attempt to gain a kind of
Stackelberg leader status, creating a short of prisonersdilemma situation. As a consequence
of the competition e¤ect, the equilibrium outcome in the Greek market is more e¢ cient than
the Cournot outcome. Therefore in the absence of taxation, delegating output decision to
subsidiaries encourages parents to compete more aggressively in the Greek market, relative
to a setting in which parents exercise direct control of the subsidiarys output.
For  > 0 the inuence that tax e¤ect has on the marginal prots of parent i is also
negative from


@~i
@ti
p

=   2p
3 (1    ) ;
in (2.13), so that the internal transfer price ti, ceteris paribus, is lower if Latin market o¤ers
a tax advantage over the Greek market. Intuitively, this cost reduction is favorable because
it o¤sets the increase in its subsidiarys taxable income that occurs by the competition
e¤ect. The opposite holds for  < 0.
The expression in (2.14) comprises three di¤erent terms. Again using the above ter-
minology, we refer to rst term as Cournot marginal revenue, to the second term as the
competition e¤ect on the output qi and to the third term as the tax e¤ect on the output qi.
24 If internal transfer price was equal to the marginal cost, the outcome in the Greek market would be
Cournot outcome.
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The signs of competition e¤ect and tax e¤ect on the output qi depend on the output level
in the Greek market and on , respectively:
For ~i >
3C
4 the inuence that the competition e¤ect has on the marginal prots of
parent i is positive from
(1  ) dp
d
dq

@~
@p
~i +
@~i
@p
~

= (1  ) 4b ( +)
3 (1    )

~i  
3C
4

;
in (2.14), so that the output in the Latin market, ceteris paribus, is above the output at the
Cournot equilibrium. Intuitively, this quantity increase is favorable because it rises the tax
liability of its subsidiarys rival without a¤ecting the marginal cost of its own subsidiary.
Each parent can o¤set exactly its own tax liability increase, reducing its internal transfer
price.
For  > 0 the inuence that the tax e¤ect has on the marginal prots of parent i is
negative from

dpd
dq

~i

1  @~
@p

+
@~i
@p
(1  2~i   p)

=  s (1  p) ( +) + 3b (1    ) ~i
3 (1    ) ;
in (2.14), so that the output in this market, ceteris paribus, is lower if the Latin market is a
tax heaven. Intuitively, this quantity reduction is favorable because it increases the transfer
price and therefore reduces the rms tax liabilities. The opposite holds for  < 0.
Solving the system of equations formed by the rst-order conditions of parents 1 and 2 we
obtain their outputs and the internal transfer prices. In the Latin market, parentsoutputs
are
q1 = q

2 = q
C +
1

d ( ;)
 ( ;; s)
:= qT ;
where
d ( ;) =  (1  )  
3
(2 (1    ) + (1 + )) ;
and
 ( ;; s) = 15 (1  )2  (15 (1  )  2s (  )) :
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Assuming that 2qT  1b , the market price is
pd(2qT ) = pC   2s d ( ;)
 ( ;; s)
:= pT :
The equilibrium internal transfer prices are t1 = t2 := tT , where
tT =  1
5
  10 (1  ) (s   4 (1  ))
5 ( ;; s)
 2 (s (   (6  5)) + 5 (1  ) (4   (1    )))
5 ( ;; s)
:
Substituting the values pT and tT into equations above we obtain the subsidiariesoutputs
1 = 

2 = ~1(p
; t1; t

2) = ~2(p
; t1; t

2) =
6
5
C   

 ( ;; s)
 ( ;; s)
:= T ;
and market price in the Greek market,
d(2T ) =
3
5
C + 2
 ( ;; s)
 ( ;; s)
:= T ;
where  ( ;; s) = 45s (  )  2 (1  ).
For > 0, the output in the Latin market decreases with if  < 12 (see Appendix 2.A for
a proof of this assertion). Thus the tax e¤ect on the output qi prevails over the competition
e¤ect. Tax incentives make a high price desirable and therefore, parents increase the market
price in the home market by reducing their outputs. Since the Latin market price increases
with , parents save on tax payments by using two sets of books.
Increased tax rates on the Greek market may have a pro-competitive e¤ect in this market
by encouraging lower internal transfer price. Thus the reduction in the internal transfer
price may prevail over the increase of tax liabilities as a result of increased tax rates and
prices in the Latin market. Whether or not output in the Greek market decreases with 
depends on the size di¤erence between markets and on the value of  (see Appendix 2.B
for a proof of this assertion).
In particular assuming that  = 0 and using again (2.4), we can rewrite the expression
for rmsoutput in the Latin market as
qT =
8<: 32qC   16b
 () s
 () = q
C + 12 ()
C if s <  ()
3
2q
C if s   ()
;
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the output in the Greek market as
T =
6
5
C ;
and the internal transfer prices as
tT =  1
5
  
3 ()
s+
8
15
 ;
where  () = 52
(1 )
 (the gray curve in Figure 2.2 is the graph of  ).
Thus, the outputs in the Latin market and the Greek market are above the output at
the Cournot equilibrium. On the one hand, parents reduce their internal transfer prices
below marginal cost in order to take advantage in the external market, creating a short of
prisonersdilemma. On the another hand, parents increase their output (i.e., reducing the
market price in the home market) in order to increase their subsidiarys rival tax liability
without a¤ecting the marginal cost of their own subsidiaries.
We have
@qT
@
=   1
62  ()
< 0;
and
@T
@b
= 0;
Thus, the output in the Latin market decreases with . Parents respond to an increase of
the size of the Greek market (i.e., as  becomes small) with an increase of the output in the
Latin market, thus reducing the Latin market price, in order to raise the tax liability of its
rivals subsidiary without a¤ecting the marginal cost of its own subsidiary. The output in
the Greek market is independent of the size b.
We have
@qT
@
=
1
15 (1  )2 > 0;
and
@T
@
= 0:
The output in the Latin market increases with  . The higher tax rates are, the larger
output in the Latin market is. Parents respond to an increase of tax with an increase of the
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output in the Latin market, thus reducing the Latin market price, in order to raise the tax
liability of its rivals subsidiary without a¤ecting the marginal cost of its own subsidiary.
The output in the Greek market is independent of  .
Let us study the total prots and total surplus under two sets of books.
Firmsprots in the Latin and Greek markets can be calculated using (2.1) and (2.4) as
TL =
8<: CL   45
s+ ()
 () if s <  ()
0 if s   ()
;
and TG =
18
25
C
G, respectively. Therefore, total prots are
T = TL +
T
G = 
C
L  

45
s+  ()
 ()
+
18
25
CG if s <  () ; (2.15)
and
T = TL +
T
G =
18
25
CG if s   () : (2.16)
The surplus in the Latin and Greek markets can be calculated using (2.6) and (2.7) as
STL =
8<:
9
8S
C
L   118b

 () s
 ()
2
= SCL +
1
18
2 () s
 ()2
if s <  ()
9
8S
C
L if s   ()
;
and STG =
27
25S
C
G , respectively. Therefore, total surplus is
ST = STL + S
T
G =
9
8
SCL +
27
25
SCG  
1
18b

 ()  s
 ()
2
if s <  () ; (2.17)
and
ST = STL + S
T
G =
9
8
SCL +
27
25
SCG if s   () : (2.18)
We summarize these results in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.2. If both rms use two sets of books and  = 0, then in a SPE:
(2.2.1) The output in the Greek market is
T =
6
5
C ;
and the output in the Latin market is
qT =
8<: 32qC   16b
 () s
 () = q
C + 12 ()
C if s <  ()
3
2q
C if s   ()
:
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Moreover, qT increases with  and converges to the e¢ cient outcome as  becomes large.
(2.2.2) The total prots are below total prots at the Cournot equilibrium.
(2.2.3) The total surplus is above the total surplus at the Cournot equilibrium.
In summary, keeping two sets of books adhering to the ALP generates a subtle link be-
tween markets that may intensify competition in both markets. On the one hand, each
parent attempts to make the subsidiary a lower cost competitor, in order to gain a com-
petitive advantage in the external market, by reducing its internal transfer price. On the
another hand, each parent attempts to increase the tax liability of its subsidiarys rival,
in order to gain a competitive advantage in the external market, by reducing the Latin
market price (i.e. increasing its production). Therefore, using two sets of books opens the
possibility to gain a competitive advantage in the external market by reducing own costs
and increasing rivals one.
In the absence of the ALP, parents have also an incentive to employ below cost transfer
prices in order to compel their subsidiaries to be more aggressive in the external market.
However incentives in the home market are unchanged and the equilibrium outcome is just
the Cournot outcome -see Lemus and Moreno (2011). Therefore, if both rms keep two sets
of books together with a transfer pricing regulation consistent with the ALP competition
intensies in the external market relative to the equilibrium where both rms using transfer
prices for tax purposes not linked to the external market price.
2.5. Asymmetric Accounting Policies
In this section we consider the case in which parent rms use asymmetric accounting
policies. We assume that parent 1 uses the market price in the Latin market as the transfer
price per intrarm transaction, i.e., it keeps only one set of books to satisfy both cost and
tax accounting requirements, while parent 2 uses two sets of books. Subsidiaries observe the
price in the Latin market and the internal transfer policy before competing in quantities.
We identify the subgame perfect equilibria (SPE henceforth) of the game. In this set up,
parents act as leaders anticipating the reactions of the subsidiary rms. We assume
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throughout this section that  = 0 (i.e., equal tax rates between markets).
Assuming that the price in the Latin market is p 2 R+, subsidiary 1 chooses its output
1 to solve
max
12R+
(1  ) (d (1 + 2)  p)1:
Subsidiary 2, knowing the internal transfer price used by its parent t2 2 R chooses its
output 2 to solve
max
22R+

d (1 + 2)  t2

2   (d (1 + 2)  p)2:
Thus, the reaction functions of subsidiaries 1 and 2 are
R1 (2; p) = max

1  p
2
  1
2
2; 0

;
and
R2 (1; p; t2) = max

1  p
2
+
p  t2
2 (1  )  
1
2
1; 0

;
respectively.
An equilibrium of the Greek market is a prole of the subsidiariesoutputs (1(p; t2);2(p; t2))
satisfying the system of equations
1 = R

1 (2; p) ;
2 = R

2 (1; p; t2) :
Solving this system we get
1(p; t2) =
8>>><>>>:
0 if t2 < p  (1  ) (1  p) ;
(1 )(1 p) (p t2)
3(1 ) if p  (1  ) (1  p) < t2 < p+ (1 )(1 p)2 ;
1 p
2 if t2 > p+
(1 )(1 p)
2 ;
(2.19)
and
2(p; t2) =
8>>><>>>:
1 p
2 +
p t2
2(1 ) if t2 < p  (1  ) (1  p) ;
(1 )(1 p)+2(p t2)
3(1 ) if p  (1  ) (1  p) < t2 < p+ (1 )(1 p)2 ;
0 if t2 > p+
(1 )(1 p)
2 :
(2.20)
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Note that in the game played by subsidiaries the equilibrium is unique.
A SPE of the game is prole of actions for parents 1 and 2, (q1; q2; t2), and a pair of func-
tions describing the subsidiaries strategies (f1 (q1; q2; t2); f2 (q1; q2; t2)) such that parents
maximize consolidated prots and subsidiaries maximize their own prots. As discussed
above, the subsidiariesgame has a unique equilibrium. Then in a SPE the subsidiaries
strategies are fi (q1; q2; t2) = i(p
d(q1; q2); t2) for i 2 f1; 2g, and parents, anticipating that
subsidiariesreactions are described by (1;2), choose their actions in order to maximize
consolidated prots
 
i

. Thus, Parent 1 chooses q1 to solve
max
q12R+
1(q1; q2; t2);
where
1(q1; q2; t2) = 1(q1; q2;1

pd(q1 + q2); t2

;2

pd(q1 + q2)

; t2):
Denote by Rq1 (t2; q2) the reaction function of Parent 1, i.e., the solution to Parent 1s prot
maximization problem.
Likewise, Parent 2 chooses its output q2 and its internal transfer price t2 in order to solve
max
(t2;q2)2RR+
2(q1; q2; t2);
where
2(q1; q2; t2) = 2(q1; q2;1

pd(q1 + q2); t2

;2

pd(q1 + q2)

; t2):
Denote by (Rq2 (q1) ; R
t
2 (q1)) the reaction functions of Parent 2, i.e., the solution to Parent
2s prot maximization problem.
Hence in a SPE of the game the prole of parentsactions, (q1; q2; t2), satisfy the system
q1 = R
q
1 (t

2; q

2) ;
q2 = R
q
2 (q

1) ;
t2 = R
t
2 (q

1) :
In an interior SPE, i.e., such that the outputs of parent and subsidiaries are positive, the
subsidiariesoutputs are
1 = 1

pd(q1 + q

2); t

2

=
(1  )  1  pd(q1 + q2)  (pd(q1 + q2)  t2)
3 (1  ) > 0;
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and
2 = 2

pd(q1 + q

2); t

2

=
(1  )  1  pd(q1 + q2)+ 2(pd(q1 + q2)  t2)
3 (1  ) > 0:
Using these formulae we can solve the system of equations formed by parents 1 and 2
reaction functions to obtain
q1 =
(1  2) s2 + 2 (5  4) s+ 12 (1  )
2b ((1  2) s+ 18 (1  )) ;
q2 =  
(1  2) s2 + 2 (5  4) s  12 (1  )
2b ((1  2) s+ 18 (1  )) ;
t2 =  
(1  2) ((1  3) s+ 12 (1  ))
2 ((1  2) s+ 18 (1  )) :
We calculate the equilibrium price in the Latin market,
pd(q1 + q

2) =
(1  2) s+ 6 (1  )
(1  2) s+ 18 (1  ) :
Substituting the values t2 and pd(q1 + q2) into the equations for 1 and 2 above we obtain
the subsidiariesoutputs,
1 =  
1
2
(1  2) s
(1  2) s+ 18 (1  ) ;
2 =
1

(1  2) s+ 12 (1  )
(1  2) s+ 18 (1  ) :
For tax rates  2 [0; 1=2), the equation above yields 1 < 0, and therefore an interior SPE
does not exist.
Proposition 2.3. Assume that parent rms use asymmetric accounting policies and  = 0.
If  2 [0; 1=2), then an interior SPE does not exist.
Since in almost all countries tax rates are below one half, we turn to studying the (corner)
SPE that arise for  2 [0; 1=2).25 Let us be given a SPE. Note that a SPE is identied by
(q1; q2; t2), since subsidiariesoutputs are given by
(1;

2) =

1

pd(q1 + q

2); t

2

;2

pd(q1 + q

2); t

2

25Auerbach et al (2008) present evidence on trends in corporation tax revenues and the industrial compo-
sition of revenues for the G7 countries (France, United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Japan, United States and
Canada) over the period 1979 to 2006. They show that statutory corporation tax rates have been falling
across the G7 economies and provide some evidence of convergence to main rates between 30% to 40%.
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in the equations (2.19) and (2.20). We establish some properties of SPE.
Claim 2.1. If 2 > 0, then t2 < p and t2 2 ( 
1
2
;
1
4
).
Proof. Assume that 2 > 0. If 1 > 0, then the rst-order condition for Parent 2s prot
maximization yields
t2 = R
t
2 (q

1; q

2) =  
1   + (1  5) pd(q1 + q2)
4
:
Since p = pd(q1 + q2)  0, then
t2   p =  
1   + (1  5) p
4
  p
=  1  
4
(1 + 5p) < 0:
Moreover, since t2 increases with  and p 2 (0; 1), then t2 2 ( 
1
2
;
1
4
).
If 1 = 0, then the rst-order condition for Parent 2s prot maximization yields
t2 = R
t
2 (q

1; q

2) =  pd(q1 + q2):
Since p = pd(q1 + q2)  0, then
t2   p =   (1  ) p < 0:
Moreover, since p 2 (0; 1) and  2 [0; 1=2), then t2 2 ( 
1
2
,0). 
Claim 2.2. If q2 = 0, then q1 > 0.
Proof. Assume q2 = 0. If t2 < pd(q1 + q2)   (1  )
 
1  pd(q1 + q2)

, then 1 = 0 and
the rst-order condition for Parent 1s prot maximization yields
q1 = R
q
1 (t

2; 0) = q
M > 0:
If pd(q1+q2) (1  )
 
1  pd(q1 + q2)

< t2 < pd(q1+q2)+
(1 )(1 pd(q1+q2))
2 , then 

1,

2 >
0 and the rst-order condition for Parent 1s prot maximization yields
q1 = R
q
1 (t

2; 0) =
1
2b
9 (1  )2 +  5 (1  2) + 32 s+ (1 + ) st2
n( ; s)
;
where n( ; s) := 9 (1  )2 + (1  2) (2  ) s. Note that n( ; s) > 0 on [0; 1=2).
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Since  < 1=2 by assumption, and t2 >  
1
2
by Claim 2.1, we have
q1 >
1
2b
9 (1  )2 +  5 (1  2) + 32 s+ (1 + ) s( 12)
n( ; s)
=
1
2b
9 (1  )2 + 3s2 (1  2) (3  )
n( ; s)
> 0:
Finally, if t2 > pd(q1 + q2) +
(1 )(1 pd(q1+q2))
2 , then 

2 = 0 and the rst-order condition
for Parent 1s prot maximization yields
q1 = R
q
1 (t

2; 0) =
1
b
s+ 2
s+ 4
> 0: 
Claim 2.3. q1 > 0.
Proof. Assume by way of contradiction that q1 = 0. If t2 < pd(q1+q2) (1  )
 
1  pd(q1 + q2)

,
then 1 = 0, and therefore
2 =
1  pd(q1 + q2)
2
+
pd(q1 + q2)  t2
2 (1  ) ;
by equation (2.20). Since q2 > 0 by Claim 2.2, then the rst-order conditions for Parent 2s
prot maximization are
q2 =
1
b
2 (1  )2 + 2s
2s+ 4 (1  )2  
1


2s+ 4 (1  )2 t

2;
t2 =  (1  bq2) :
Solving this system of equations we get (q2; t2;2) = (qM ,

2 ,
M ). However,
q1 = R
q
1

2
; qM

=
qM
2
> 0;
contradicting that q1 = 0.
If pd(q1 + q2)   (1  )
 
1  pd(q1 + q2)

< t2 < pd(q1 + q2) +
(1 )(1 pd(q1+q2))
2 , then
1,2 > 0, and therefore
1 =
(1  )  1  pd(q1 + q2)  (pd(q1 + q2)  t2)
3 (1  ) ;
2 =
(1  )  1  pd(q1 + q2)+ 2(pd(q1 + q2)  t2)
3 (1  ) :
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by equations (2.19) and (2.20). Since q2 > 0 by Claim 2.2, then the rst-order conditions
for Parent 2s prot maximization are
q2 =
1
2b
s
 
5 (1  2) + 32   3 (3  5)+ 9 (1  )2
g ( ; s)
+
1
2
1  5
g ( ; s)
t2;
t2 =  
1  3
2
+
b
4
(1  5) q2;
where g ( ; s) := 9 (1  )2   (1  2) (1 + ) s.
Solving this system of equations we get
(q2; t

2;

1;

2) =

2
b
2  s
8  s;
 (7 + s)  3
8  s ; 
1 + s
 (8  s) ;
6
 (8  s)

:
Hence either 1 < 0 or 2 < 0, and therefore such a prole cannot be an SPE.
If t2 > pd(q1 + q2) +
(1 )(1 pd(q1+q2))
2 , then 

2 = 0, and therefore
1 =
1  pd(q1 + q2)
2
;
by equation (2.19). Since q2 > 0 by Claim 2.2, then the rst-order condition for Parent 2s
prot maximization yields
q2 = q
M :
However,
q1 = R
q
1
 
qM

=
1
2b
s+ 2
s+ 4
> 0;
contradicting that q1 = 0. 
Claim 2.4. 1 > 0.
Proof. Assume by way of contradiction that 1 = 0. Then
2 =
1  pd(q1 + q2)
2
+
pd(q1 + q2)  t2
2 (1  ) > 0;
by equation (2.20). Since q1 > 0 by Claim 2.3, the rst-order condition for Parent 1s prot
maximization yields
q1 =
1  bq2
2b
;
85
and the rst-order conditions for Parent 2s prot maximization yield the system
q2 = max
 
0;
1
b
2 (1  )2 + 2s
2s+ 4 (1  )2  
1


2s+ 4 (1  )2 t

2  
2 (1  )2 + 2s
2s+ 4 (1  )2 q

1
!
;
t2 =  (1  b (q1 + q2)) :
Solving this system of equations we get (q1; q2; t2) =
 
qC ; qC ; 3

. Substituting these values
into equation (2.19) yields
1 = 1

pd(2qC);

3

=
1
12
> 0;
contradicting that 1 = 0. 
Claim 2.5. 2 > 0.
Proof. Assume by way of contradiction that 2 = 0. Then
1 =
1  pd(q1 + q2)
2
> 0;
by equation (2.19). Since q1 > 0 by Claim 2.3, the rst-order condition for prot maximiza-
tion of parents 1 and 2 yield the system
q1 =
1
b
s+ 2
s+ 4
  s+ 2
s+ 4
q2;
q2 = max

0;
1
2b
(1  bq1)

:
Solving this system of equations we get
(q1; q

2) =

s+ 2
b (s+ 6)
;
2
b (s+ 6)

:
In a SPE, the level of output q2 = 2=b (s+ 6) > 0 must maximize Parent 2s prot taking
as given q1 =
s+2
b(s+6) and the subsidiaries reactions (1; 2). Then q

2 solves the system
given by the rst-order conditions for Parent 2s prot maximization
q2 =
1
2b
2s
 
13   5  2  2+ 36 (1  )2   s2 (1  ) (2  )
(s+ 6) g ( ; s)
+
1
2
1  5
g ( ; s)
t2;
t2 =  
1
4
2 (5  13) + s (1  )
s+ 6
+
b
4
(1  5) q2:
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The solution to this system is
q^2 =
s (s+ 10)  16
b (s  8) (s+ 6) :
For s > 0, q^2 6= 2=b (s+ 6), which leads to a contradiction. Hence 2 > 0. 
With these results in hand, we can now identify the parameter values of  and s = b= for
which a pure strategy SPE exists, and identify the equilibrium outputs and prots. Dene
l() := 3 (1  ) = (2  ), and h() := 12 (1  ) = (1 + ). The functions l and h are both
decreasing, and l() < h() on [0; 1] in Figure 2.1 the thin (resp. thick) curve is the graph
of l (resp. h). Also write r( ; s) := (5  7) s+24 (1  ). Note that r( ; s) > 0 on [0; 1=2).
t
s
12
2
3
2
1
( )th
( )tl
0
8
Figure 2.1. Functions l and h:
Proposition 2.4: Assume that  < 1=2 and  = 0. If Parent 1 uses one set of books
and Parent 2 uses two sets of books, then a unique (pure strategy) SPE exist whenever
l() < s < 8, whereas no (pure strategy) SPE exists otherwise. Moreover:
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(2.4.1) If l() < s < minfh(); 8g, then the outputs of parents and subsidiaries in the
unique SPE are
(q1; q

2) =

2qC +
4 (2  )
3b
s  l()
r( ; s)
; 0

;
and
(1;

2) =

3
4

C   (1 + )

h()  s
r( ; s)

;
3
2

C +
(1 + )
3
h()  s
r( ; s)

;
and parentsprots are
1 =
9
16
CG  
 
1  2  (7  17) s2   12 (1  ) (s+ 16)
16b
h()  s
r( ; s)2
;
2 =
9
8
CG +
3
 
1  2 ((3  5) s+ 20 (1  ))
8
h()  s
r( ; s)2
:
(2.4.2) If h()  s < 8, then the outputs of parents and subsidiaries are
(q1; q

2;

1;

2) =

3qC ; 0;
3
4
C ;
3
2
C

;
and the parentsprots are
(1;

2) =

9
16
CG;
9
8
CG

:
Proof. Since q1,1,2 > 0, by claims 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5, and since by Proposition 2.3 there
is no SPE such that these inequalities and q2 > 0 hold, then in a (pure strategy) SPE, when
it exists, we have q2 = 0. Since 1,2 > 0 by claims 2.4 and 2.5, then
1 =
(1  )  1  pd(q1 + q2)  (pd(q1 + q2)  t2)
3 (1  ) ;
2 =
(1  )  1  pd(q1 + q2)+ 2(pd(q1 + q2)  t2)
3 (1  ) ;
by equations (2.19) and (2.20). Since q1 > 0 by Claim 2.2 and q2 = 0, the rst-order
condition for Parent 1s prot maximization yields
q1 = R
q
1 (t

2; 0) =
1
2b
s
 
5 (1  2) + 32+ 9 (1  )2
n( ; s)
+
1
2
1 + 
n( ; s)
t2;
and the rst-order condition for Parent 2s prot maximization yields
t2 = R
t
2 (q

1; 0) =  
1  3
2
+
b
4
(1  5) q1:
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Solving this system of equations we get
q1 =
1
b
  (1 + )
b
h()  s
r( ; s)
;
t2 =  
1  
4
  1 + 
4
h()  s
r( ; s)
(1  5) ;
1 =
(2  )

s  l()
r( ; s)
and
2 =
2

(1  2) s+ 9 (1  )
r( ; s)
:
(These values for q1, 1 and 2 can be readily rewritten using the formulae given in (4:1)
of Proposition 2.4.) Thus, 1  0 whenever s  l(). Since in equilibrium 1 > 0 by Claim
2.5, then a SPE does not exist whenever s  l(). Assume that l() < s. The equilibrium
prices in the Latin is
p = pd(q1) =
h ()  s
(1 + ) r( ; s)
:
Thus, in order for p > 0 we must have s < h(). Assume that h() > s. The equilibrium
price in the Greek markets is
 = d(1 + 

2) =
(1  2) s+ 9 (1  )
r( ; s)
> 0:
In order to verify that the prole identied is SPE we need to show that the level of
output q2 = 0 maximizes Parent 2s prots taking q1 as given. The system given by the
rst-order conditions for Parent 2s prot maximization is
q2 =
1
2b
3 (1  )

36 (1  )2   s (27   (32 + 11)) + s2  293     8s2
g ( ; s) r( ; s)
+
1
2
1  5
g ( ; s)
t2;
t2 =  
s (1   (2  3)) + 3 (3  7) (1  )
r( ; s)
+
b
4
(1  5) q2:
Solving this system we get
q2 =
1
b
4s (s+ 10)  8s (s+ 4)  48 (1  )
(s  8) r( ; s) :
In order for q2  0 we must have
 () :=
p
37  4 (19  10)  5 + 4
1  2  s  8:
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Since s > l() >  () on [0; 1=2), for q2  0 we must have s < 8. In summary, the prole of
parents and subsidiariesoutputs as well as the transfer price of parent 2 identied above
forms a SPE when l() < s < h() and s < 8, i.e., l() < s < minfh(); 8g. Thus, when
this is the case there is a unique SPE and it is given by the formulae given in (4:1) of
Proposition 2.4.
Now suppose that s  h(). Then in equilibrium p = 0, and therefore q1  1b . Then the
rst-order condition for Parent 2s prot maximization yields
t2 = R
t
2

1
b
; 0

=  1  
4
;
and therefore,
(1;

2) = (
3
4
C ;
3
2
C);
by equations (2.19) and (2.20). The equilibrium price in the Greek markets is
 = d(1 + 

2) =
3
4
C :
In order for q2 = 0 to maximize the prots of Parent 2 taking as given q1 =
1
b , the solution
to the system dened the rst-order conditions,
q2 =  
1  
2
2  
g ( ; s)
+
1
2
1  5
g ( ; s)
t2;
t2 =  
1  
4
+
b
4
(1  5) q2:
Solving this system of equations we get
~q2 =
1

1
s  8 :
For ~q2  0 we must also have s < 8. Hence the prole of outputs and transfer price dene
above forms a SPE when h() < s < 8.
Finally, if s  l(), then 1  0, and since in equilibrium 1 > 0 by Claim 2.5, then a
SPE does not exist. And if s  8, then whether s < h(), or s  h() neither of the two
candidate equilibria identied are SPE, and therefore a pure strategy SPE does not exist
either.
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The parentsequilibrium prots for the cases l() < s < minfh(); 8g and h() < s <
8 are readily obtained simply by substituting parentsand subsidiariesoutputs into the
formulae of the consolidated prots. 
In an equilibrium in which parents use asymmetric accounting policies, the parent that
uses one set of books, say Parent 1, has an incentive to increase its output in order to
alleviate double marginalization (i.e., to decrease the cost of its subsidiary), whereas the
parent that uses two sets of books, Parent 2, decreases its output all the way to zero in
order to increase the cost of its subsidiarys rival. Thus Parent 1 becomes the dominant
producer in the home market. Since t2 < p by claims 2.1 and 2.5, Subsidiary 2 becomes
the dominant producer in the external market. The equilibrium prots of Parent 2 uses two
sets of books dominate equilibrium prots of Parent 1 uses one set of books (i.e., 2 > 1,
see Appendix 2.C).
Assume that l() < s < minfh(); 8g. Then the total output in the Latin market satises
q1 + q

2 = q

1 = 2q
C +
4 (2  )
3b
s  l()
r( ; s)
> 2qC ;
and the total output in the Greek market satises
1 + 

2 = 2
C +
2  
3
s  l()
r( ; s)
> 2C :
Hence the surplus in both markets is above the surplus at the Cournot equilibrium, i.e.,
SL > S
C
L and S

G > S
C
G . Since S
C
L > S
O
L and S
C
G > S
O
G by Proposition 2.1, the surplus
in both markets is above under one set of books. In the Appendix 2.D we show that
SL + S

G < S
T and therefore, the total surplus is below under two sets of books.
We have
@q1
@
=  12 (1  )
2r( ; s)2
(7  5) < 0;
and
@ (1 + 2)
@b
=
3 (1  )
2r( ; s)2
(7  5) > 0:
Thus, the output in the Latin (Greek) market decreases (increases) with  (b). Parent 1
responds to an increase of the size of the Greek market (i.e., a smaller value of ) with an
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increase of the output in the Latin market, thus reducing the Latin market price (in order
to alleviate the double marginalization problem) and avoiding a large reduction of the sales
of its subsidiary. The market share of subsidiary 2 increases with the size of the Latin since
its output decreases with b. Subsidiary 1 is more (less) aggressive competitor in the Greek
market as the prots in the Latin market become negligible (large).
Also we have
@q1
@
= 12
s+ 2
r( ; s)2
> 0;
and
@ (1 + 2)
@
= 3s
s+ 2
r( ; s)2
> 0:
The output in the Latin market of parent 1 increases with  . The higher tax rates are, the
larger output in the Latin market of parent 1 is. This occurs because a larger the Latin
market output (to compensate for q2 = 0) tends to reduce the di¤erence between the tax
bill paid at the Latin and the Greek markets. The output of subsidiary 1 (2) increases
(decreases) with  . Parent 1 responds to an increase of tax with an increase of the output
in the Latin market, thus reducing the Latin market price. A decrease in the Latin market
price encourages the subsidiary 1 to behave more aggressively by expanding its output in
the Greek market and thus causes subsidiary 2 to become less aggressive by reducing its
outcome.
If h() < s < 8, then
q1 + q

2 = q

1 = 3q
C > 2qC ;
and
1 + 

2 =
9
4
C > 2C :
Hence the surplus in both markets is above the surplus at the Cournot equilibrium, i.e.,
SL > S
C
L and S

G > S
C
G . Since S
C
L > S
O
L and S
C
G > S
O
G by Proposition 2.1, the surplus
in both markets is above under one set of books. In the Appendix 2.D we show that
SL + S

G < S
T and therefore, the total surplus is below under two sets of books.
Of course, our results would be symmetric if Parent 1 uses two sets of books and Parent
2 uses one set of books. Henceforth we use the superscripts OT and O T to refer to the
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outputs and prots of the rm using one and two sets of books, respectively, in a situation
where parents use asymmetric accounting policies; i.e., q OT = q1, 
OT = 1 and O
T = 1,
whereas qO T = q2, O
T = 2 and O
T = 2, where the star values are those given in
Proposition 2.4 above.
2.6. Endogenizing the Choice of Accounting Policies
We now turn to study parentschoice of accounting policies. We assume that parents can
commit to keeping either one set of books or two sets of books. This assumption is reasonable
if, for example, the costs associated with changing the accounting policy are su¢ ciently high.
Göx (2000) notes that a new accounting policy usually requires substantial investments in
developing or acquiring software and in training employees and/or hiring consultants. By
choosing to keep one set of books, a parent commits to using the Latin market price as the
transfer price per intrarm transaction, regardless of its competitor actions. Likewise, by
choosing to keep two sets of books, a parent commits to using an internal transfer price to
allocate costs, whatever action of its competitor.
In section 2.3, we identied the parentsprots when both parents choose one set of books,
O and in section 2.4, we identied the parentsprots when both parents choose two sets
of books, T . Likewise, in section 2.5 we identied the prots in a (pure strategy) SPE
when parents choose asymmetric accounting policies, OT and OT , where the superscripts
OT and O T refer to the parent using one and two sets of books, respectively. Thus, at the
stage of choosing their accounting policies parents, assuming that following their decisions
a (pure strategy) SPE follows, parentspayo¤s are described by the following matrix:
O2 T2
O1 O;O 
OT ;O T
T1 O
T ; OT T ;T
Table 2.1: ParentsChoice of Accounting Policies.
We study the equilibria of this game. Recall from Proposition 2.2 the function dening
T di¤er in the space ( ; s) depending on the sign of the inequality s R  (). Likewise, from
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Proposition 2.4 the functions dening OT and OT di¤er in the space ( ; s) depending
on the sign of the inequality s R h (). In Appendix 2.E we study the sign of T    OT ,
which is the prot gain or loss to a parent that deviates to choosing one set of books from a
situation where both parents choose two sets of books. In Appendix 2.F we study the sign
of O  O T , which is the prot gain or loss to a parent that deviates to choosing two sets
of books from a situation where both parents choose one set of books.
On the parameter space ( ; s) parentsprots congure the game described in Table 2.1
as a prisonersdilemma (with a unique Pareto ine¢ cient Nash equilibrium in which both
parents choose two sets of books), a game of chicken (with one parent choosing one set
of books and the other parent choosing two sets of books), a coordination game (in which
both parents choose two sets of books or both parents choose one set of books), or even to
a cooperation game with a unique Pareto e¢ cient Nash equilibrium (in which both parents
choose one set of books).
In Appendixes 2.3 and 2.4 we show that T >  OT and O > O T whenever
min f () ; h ()g < s < 8. In this region, characterized by relatively high tax rates ( > 15)
and a large value of the size of the Greek market relative to that of the Latin (s > 52), the
game in Table 2.1 is a Coordination Game (CO) that has two pure strategy Nash equilibria,
one in which both parents choose two sets of books, and another one in which choose one
set of books.
When s < min f () ; h ()g identifying the signs of T   OT and O O T is cumber-
some. We show that if l() < s < 1:385, then T < OT . If 1:385 < s < min f () ; h ()g
and the tax rates are not too high, then T >  OT (see Figure 2.3 in Appendix 2.E). We
also show that if 1.23 < s < 2.26, then O < O T . If l() < s < 1.23 or 2.26 < s <
min f () ; h ()g, there is a critical value e such that O Q O T whenever  Q e (see
Figure 2.4 in Appendix 2.F). These results allow to identify the possible types of the game
that Table 2.1 may give rise depending of the values of s and  :
(i) If l() < s < 1.23, then T <  OT , and Table 2.1 describes either a Game of Chicken
(CH) (when O < OT ) or a Cooperation Game (CP) (when O > OT ) depending on
whether the value of  is high or very high, respectively. In a CH game there are two pure
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strategy Nash equilibria, in these equilibria one rm uses one set of books and the other
uses two sets of books. In a CP game it is a dominant strategy for both rms to use one
set of books.
(ii) If 1.23 < s < 1:385, then O < O T and T <  OT , and hence Table 2.1 describes
a CH game.
(iii) If 1:385 < s < 2.26, then O < O T , and the game in Table 2.1 is either a Prisoners
Dilemma game (PD) (when T >  OT ) or a CH game (when T <  OT ), depending on
whether  is low or high, respectively. In a PD game keeping two sets of books is the unique
equilibrium (and is in dominant strategies).
(iv) If 2.26 < s < min f () ; h ()g, then there are parameter constellations such that
T 7  OT and/or O 7 O T . In this case, all four types of games (PD, CO, CH and CP)
may emerge as the tax rate  increases from low, to intermediate, to high values.
In Figure 2.2 below, the gray curve is the graph of the function  , the thin curve is the
graph of the function l and thick curve is the graph of the function h. The gure indicates
the regions of parameters for which the game of Table 2.1 is a member of the di¤erent
classes in the taxonomy described above. A PD game arises for low tax rates if s > 1:385.
For high tax rates (i.e., for value of  near 12) a CP game arises when the Latin market is
not too small relative to the Greek market (i.e., when s is near 1), and a CO arises when
the Latin market is signicantly smaller than the Greek market. For intermediate tax rates
CH game arises when the Latin market is not too small relative to the Greek market, and
a CO arises when the Latin market is signicantly smaller than the Greek market.
We summarize these results in Proposition 2.5 below.
Proposition 2.5: Assume that  < 1=2 and  = 0. Depending on the values of  and s
the game facing parents when they choose their accounting policies may be a Coordination
Game, a Cooperation Game, a Game of Chicken or a Prisoners Dilemma Game. In
particular for most of the size di¤erence between markets, when the tax rates are high, there
is an equilibrium in which parents keep one set of books (this equilibrium is unique when the
both markets are similar in size) and when tax rates are low, keeping two sets of books is
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Figure 2.2. Nature of the Game in Table 2.1.
the unique equilibrium. Asymmetric accounting policies, where one parent keeps one set of
books and the other keeps two sets of books, may be sustained in equilibrium when the size
of the Latin market is not too small relative to that of the Greek market.
Propositions 5 provides a rationale for the mixed empirical evidence on the use of alter-
native accounting system. Also it identies the parameter constellations for which there
are strategic incentives for maintaining one set of books, i.e., for using the same transfer
prices for tax reporting and for managerial purposes. Since keeping one set of books pro-
vides parents with an instrument to soften competition in the Greek market, our analysis
provides a convincing explanation of how the choice of the accounting policy can serve as a
precommitment device. In our setting, the regulatory constraint (i.e., transfer prices for tax
purposes must be consistent with the ALP) introduces possibilities for tacit coordination,
and provides a rationale for why parents delegate quantity decisions to subsidiaries.
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2.7. Conclusions
The OECDs recommendation that transfer prices between parent rms and their sub-
sidiaries be consistent with the ALP for tax purposes does not restrict internal pricing
policies. Since transfer prices serve both to allocate costs to subsidiaries and to determine
tax liability in the jurisdictions where rms operate, the incentive and tax transfer prices
would be di¤erent. Thus, in practice, taxes commit rms to the adoption of a particular
accounting policy. When rms use the same transfer price (and hence, a transfer price
consistent with the ALP) for tax reporting and for providing incentives, they keep one set
of books, and when rms use di¤erent transfer prices for each purpose, they keep two sets
of books.
In a context of imperfectly competitive markets where rms are vertical separated, we
nd that accounting policies determine the properties of market outcomes: if parents keep
one set of books, competition in the external (home) market softens (intensies) relative
to an equilibrium where parents and subsidiaries are integrated. In contrast, if rms keep
two sets of books or keep asymmetric accounting policies, competition intensies in both
markets.
In this paper we show that the choice between one or two sets of books may serve as
a precommitment device. When parents choose their accounting policies there exists a
wide variety of game forms for alternative parameter depending on the di¤erences in the
market size and tax rates. The possible types of the game varies from a prisonersdilemma
(with a unique Pareto ine¢ cient Nash equilibrium in which both parents choose two sets
of books) to a game of chicken (with one parent choosing one set of books and the other
parent choosing two sets of books ) or a coordination game (in which both parents choose
two sets of books or both parents choose one set of books). There also exist parameter
constellations of market sizes and tax rates such that the type of game is a cooperation
game (with a unique Pareto e¢ cient Nash equilibrium in which both parents choose one set
of books).
Our results provide a possible explanation for the mixed empirical evidence on the use
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of alternative accounting systems. Particularly, the choice of a Pareto superior strategy
(i.e., one set of books) can be supported as an equilibrium action under broad conditions.
Specically, for most of the size di¤erence between markets, when tax rates are high, there
is an equilibrium in which parents keep one set of books. Interestingly, the prospect to tacit
coordination may contribute to a better understanding of why rms decentralize. Therefore,
vertical separation of parent and subsidiary rms, whose motivation is not well understood
in the absence of frictions when quantities are strategic substitutes, may be justied if rms
keep one set of books.
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Appendix 2.A.
If  < 12 , then
@qT
@ < 0 for all s.
Proof. We have
@qT
@
=   (1  )
 (15 (1  ) (  (1  )) + 2s(  ))2	;
where
	 = 5 (3  7) + 10  (  2 (1  )) + 22+ 2s (  )2 :
Write  (; s) and  (; s) for the value  that solves 	 = 0 given  and s. We omit the
expressions of  (; s) and  (; s) because of its length. Then we have 	 > 0, whenever
 (; s) <  <  (; s) and 	 < 0, otherwise. Since  = 12 is the minimum value of  (; s)
which is yield when  = 12 for all s, then  <
1
2 implies  <  (; s), and therefore 	 > 0:
Thus if  < 12 , then 	 > 0 and therefore
@qT
@ < 0 for all s. 
Appendix 2.B.
If  is su¢ ciently low, there is a critical value s such that @
T
@ Q 0 whenever s R s.
Proof. We have
@T
@
=
2 (1  )
 (2s(  )  15 (1  ) (1  ( +)))2	;
where
	 = 15 (1  )2   2s  22   3 (1  ) (2  ) :
Write  (; s) for the value of  that solve 	 = 0 given and s. We omit the expression
of  (; s) because of its length. Then we have 	 R 0, and therefore @T@ R 0, whenever
 Q  (; s). In the limit, as s approaches zero,  = 1 for all  and as s approaches
innity,  = 0 if  = 0. Note that  2 (0; 1) and  decreases with s for all . Since
lims!0  (; s) = 1 and lims!1  (0; s) = 0, then  decreases with s for all  implies there
is a critical value s such that  Q  (0) whenever s R s; and therefore 	 Q 0. Thus we have
	 Q 0, and therefore @T@ Q 0, whenever s R s. 
99
Appendix 2.C.
If l() < s < 8, then 2  1 > 0.
Proof. Assume  < 1=2,  = 0 and l() < s < 8. If s < h(), we calculate the di¤erence
of prots between parent 2 and parent 1 at the equilibrium described in (4:1) of Proposition
2.4 as
2  1 =
3 (1  )
br( ; s)2

s (1  ) (43  35 + 3s (3  7))  s3 (1  2)  48 (1  )2

:
We omit the expression of  () and  () for the values of s that solves 2   1 = 0 for
 < 12 because of its length. We have 

2   1 > 0 whenever  () < s <  (). Since
 () < l() < s < minfh(); 8g <  (), then 2   1 > 0. If s > h(), we calculate the
di¤erence of prots between parent 2 and parent 1 at the equilibrium described in (4:2) of
Proposition 2.4 as 2  1 = 916CG > 0. Therefore if l() < s < 8, then whether s < h(),
or s  h(), 2  1 > 0. 
Appendix 2.D.
Let us study the total surplus in a situation where parents use asymmetric accounting
policies in term of the total surplus when both rms use two sets of books:
If h()  s < 8 and  () < s, then SL + SG < ST .
Proof. Assume  < 1=2,  = 0, h()  s < 8 and  () < s. Using equations (2.6) and
(2.18) we calculate the total surplus at the equilibrium described in (4:2) of Proposition 2.4
as
SL + S

G = S
T   9
800
;
and therefore
SL + S

G < S
T :
If  () > s > h(), then SL + S

G < S
T .
Proof. Assume  < 1=2,  = 0 and  () > s > h(). Using equations (2.6) and (2.17)
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we calculate the total surplus at the equilibrium described in (4:2) of Proposition 2.4 as
SL + S

G = S
T +
S
7200b (1  )2 ;
where
S = 64s22 + 400 (1  )2   s (239 + 81) (1  ) :
We omit the expression of ! () for the value of s that solves S = 0 given  because of its
length. Then we have S R 0, and therefore SOT R ST , whenever s R ! (). Since
! ()   () < 0;
for all  , then ! ()   () < 0 implies
s < ! () ;
and therefore
SL + S

G < S
T :
If  () < s < h() and s < 8, then SL + S

G < S
T .
Proof. Assume that  < 1=2,  = 0,  () < s < h() and s < 8. Using equations (2.6)
and (2.18) we calculate the total surplus at the equilibrium described in (4:1) of Proposition
2.4 as
SL + S

G = S
T   S
50br ( ; s)2
;
where
S = s
 
3 (283  683) (1  )  3s2 (10  17) + s (235 +  (589   724))+3600 (1  )2 :
We omit the expression of ! () for the value of s that solves S = 0 given  because of
its length. Then we have S R 0, and therefore SOT R ST , whenever s R ! (). Since
! ()  h () < 0;
for all  , then ! ()  h () < 0 implies
s < ! () ;
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and therefore
SL + S

G < S
T :
If s < h (), s <  () and l() < s < 8, then SL + S

G < S
T .
Proof. Assume that  < 1=2,  = 0, s < h (), s <  () and l() < s < 8. Using
equations (2.6) and (2.17) we calculate the total surplus at the equilibrium described in
(4:1) of Proposition 2.4 as
SL + S

G = S
T +
eS
450b (1  )2 r ( ; s)2 ;
where
eS = 4s42 (5  7)2   18 000 (1  )4   s3 (1  ) (230   (1631  1865))
 2s2 (745   (2474   17)) (1  )2   3s (493 + 547) (1  )3 :
Since eS is negative for all s if  = 12 , then eS increases with  (recall @qT@ > 0 and @T@ = 0)
implies eS is negative in the space ( ; s), and therefore
SL + S

G < S
T :
Appendix 2.E.
Let us study total prots of the rm using one set of books in a situation where parents
use asymmetric accounting policies in term of total prots if both parents use two sets of
books:
If h()  s < 8 and  () < s, then OT < T .
Proof. Assume  < 1=2,  = 0, h()  s < 8 and  () < s. Using (2.16), we calculate
rms total prots under one set of books when its competitor keeps two sets of books
described in (4:2) of Proposition 2.4 as
OT = T   7 (1  )
400
;
and therefore
OT < T :
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If  () > s > h(), then OT < T .
Proof. Assume  < 1=2,  = 0 and  () > s > h(). Using (2.15), these prots can be
calculated as
OT = T +

3600b (1  ) ;
where  = 32s22   s (63  143) (1  )   400 (1  )2. We omit the expression of  ()
for the value of s that solves  = 0 given  because of its length. Then we have  R 0, and
therefore OT R T , whenever s R  (). Since
h()   () < 0 and  ()   () < 0;
for all  , then h()   () < 0 and  ()   () < 0 implies
s <  () ;
and therefore
OT < T :
If  () < s < h() and s < 8, then OT < T .
Proof. Assume that  < 1=2,  = 0,  () < s < h() and s < 8. Using (2.16), we
calculate rms total prots under one set of books when its competitor keeps two sets of
books described in (4:1) of Proposition 2.4 as
OT = T   3 (1  )
25br( ; s)2
;
where
 = (1  )  s (109 + 91) + s2 (85  149)  s3 (5  16)  1200 (1  )2 :
Write 1 () for the value of s that solves  = 0 if  <
5
16 and 2 () for the value of s that
solves  = 0 if  =2  0; 516 (i.e., there are two real roots for the value of s that solves  = 0:
one in the interval  2  0; 516 and the other  =2  0; 516). We omit the expressions of 1 ()
and 2 () for the value of s that solves  = 0 given  because of its length.
We have  R 0, and therefore OT S T , whenever s R 1 (). Since
 ()  1 () > 0;
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for  < 516 , then  ()  1 () > 0 implies
s > 1 () ;
and therefore OT < T . We have  R 0, and therefore OT S T , whenever s R 2 ().
Since
 ()  2 () > 0;
for  > 516 , then  ()  2 () > 0 implies
s > 2 () ;
and therefore OT < T . Thus whether  2  0; 516, or  =2  0; 516,
2  1 > 0:
If s < h (), s <  () and l() < s < 8, then OT < T whenever s < 1:385, whereas
OT Q T whenever  Q b and s > 1:385.
Proof. Assume that  < 1=2,  = 0, s < h (), s <  () and l() < s < 8. Using (2.15),
these prots can be calculated as
OT = T +
b
225b (1  ) r( ; s)2 ;
where
b =   (1  )2  3s (2981  2941) (1  ) + 4s2  730  2317 + 14442
 s3 (1  )  437   52   260+ 18 000 (1  )4 + 2s42 (5  7)2 :
There is no closed form solutions for the value of s that solves b( ; s) = 0. Figure 2.3
below are the graphs of the function b for di¤erent values of  . As graphically displayed
by the Figure 2.3 if  = 12 , the values of s must lie between 1 and
5
2 and
b is positive for
all s and if  = 0, the values of s must lie between 32 and 8 and
b is negative for all s. Alsob increases with  if s > 1:385 and decreases with  , otherwise. Therefore for s > 1:385,
since b < 0 if  = 0 and b > 0 if  = 12 , then b increases with  implies there is a critical
value b such that b Q 0 whenever  Q b . Then we have b Q 0, and therefore OT Q T ,
whenever  Q b . For s < 1:385, since b > 0 for  = 12 , then b decreases with  impliesb > 0 for all  and therefore OT > T .
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Figure 2.3. Graphs of the function ^ (s) for di¤erent values of  :
Appendix 2.F.
Let us study the prots of the rm using two sets of books in a situation where parents
use asymmetric accounting policies in term of total prots if both parents use one set of
books:
If h()  s < 8, then OT < T .
Proof. Assume  < 1=2,  = 0 and h()  s < 8. Using (2.12), we calculate rms
total prots under two sets of books when its competitor keeps one set of books described
in (4:2) of Proposition 2.4 as
OT = O   3 (1  )
8b (8s+ 27)2
 
216 + 117s+ 16s2

;
and therefore
OT < O:
If l () < s < h() and s < 8, then OT > O whenever s 2 (1:23; 2:26), whereas
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OT Q O whenever  R e and s =2 (1:23; 2:26).
Proof. Assume that  < 1=2,  = 0, l () < s < h() and s < 8. Using (2.12), we
calculate rms total prots under two sets of books when its competitor keeps one set of
books described in (4:1) of Proposition 2.4 as
OT = O +
3 (1  )
b (8s+ 27)2 r( ; s)2
e;
where
e = 3s3 (555   (2222  1769))   8s5 (1 + ) (3  5) + 4s4 (21 +  (130  203))
 

15 552 (1  )2   9  s2 (1009   (2450  1429)) + 18s (1  ) (43  27) :
There is no closed form solutions for the value of s that solves e = 0. Figure 2.4 below are
the graphs of the function e for di¤erent values of  . As graphically displayed by the Figure
2.4 if  = 12 the values of s must lie between 1 and 4 and
e is positive for all s 2 (1:23; 2:26)
and if  = 0, the values of s must lie between 32 and 8 and
e is positive for all s. Also e
decreases with  for all s. For s 2 (1:23; 2:26), since e > 0 for  = 12 , then e decreases with
 implies e > 0 for all  and therefore OT > O. For a given s =2 (1:23; 2:26), since e < 0
for  = 12 and
e > 0 for  = 0, then e decreases with  implies there is a critical value e
such that e Q 0 whenever  R e . Then we have e Q 0, and therefore OT Q O, whenever
 R e .
If  () < s < h(), then OT < O.
Proof. Assume that  < 1=2,  = 0,  () < s < h(). Since the sign of OT   T is
positive, we discuss the sign of O   O T in order to characterize the SPE in this region
of parameters. For s =  (), the equation above yields e < 0 for all  : Since e < 0 if
s =  (), then e decreases with  implies e < 0 for all s >  () and therefore OT < O.
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Figure 2.4. Graphs of the function e (s) for di¤erent values of  :
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CHAPTER 3. THE NON-NEUTRALITY OF THE ARMS LENGTH
PRINCIPLE WITH IMPERFECT COMPETITION
3.1. Introduction
International tax authorities have become increasingly aware of the possible use of trans-
fer prices as a device for shifting prots into low tax jurisdictions. Transfer pricing policies
have important implications since exports and imports from related parties are a dominant
portion of trade ows see Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2009). In order to discourage tax
shifting activities by multinational rms, most countries follow taxation policies that are
based on the OECDs Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax
Administrations, which recommend that, for tax purposes, internal pricing policies be con-
sistent with the Arms Length Principle (ALP); i.e., that transfer prices between companies
of multinational enterprises for tax purposes be established on a market value basis, thus
comparable to transactions between independent (unrelated) parties see OECD (2010).
Tax authorities from all OECD member nations rely on the ALP to protect their revenue
base by preventing incomes shifting from one country to another for reasons unrelated to
the economic nature of the transactions. We study the consequences of adopting the ALP
when markets are imperfectly competitive.26
Hirshleifer (1956) shows that the application of the ALP is inconsequential under perfect
competition. The simplest version of Hirshleifers (1956) model assumes a decentralized
rm consisting of a headquarters and two divisions, the upstream and downstream divisions.
The upstream division produces an intermediate good and supplies it to the downstream
division. The downstream division processes this intermediate good and sells it in the nal
26Under the ALP rms are free to charge their subsidiaries either the same or di¤erent prices to those used
for tax purposes, i.e., rms may keep either one set of books or two sets of books. Lemus (2011) provides an
analysis of rmsstrategic incentives for choosing either alternative, and shows that under broad conditions
keeping one set of book is an equilibrium. Here we assume that adopting the ALP leads parent rms to
keep one set of books, thus transferring the good to their subsidiaries at market prices.
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good market. Each division maximizes it own prots ignoring the impact of its decisions on
the prots of the other division or the rm as a whole. The problem of headquarters consists
of nding a transfer pricing policy that coordinates the decisions of the two divisions so that
consolidated prots are maximized. The e¢ cient level of internal trade can be implemented
by setting transfer prices at the opportunity cost of the intermediate good. If there is a
competitive market for the intermediate good, the opportunity cost of the intermediate
good is equal to the market price. If no market exists, the optimal transfer price equals the
marginal cost of the intermediate good. Thus, setting the transfer price equal to the market
price is consistent with the Arms Length Principle, and leads to an e¢ cient allocation of
resources. Hirshleifers result depends crucially on the assumption that the intermediate
good market is perfectly competitive. As we shall see, under imperfect competition the
ALP signicantly distorts the resource allocation (as well as rmstax liabilities).
In this paper, abstracting from issues arising due to di¤erences on tax rates in each
jurisdiction, we examine the consequences of adopting transfer pricing policies adhering
to the ALP under imperfect competition and vertical separation. (If rms are vertically
integrated, then transfer pricing policies are irrelevant.) In our setting parents compete
in quantities in a home market and set the prices at which they sell the good to their
subsidiaries (either directly or indirectly via their output choices), which in turn compete
in quantities in an external market. As customary, we assume that parents maximize
consolidated prots, while subsidiaries maximize their own prots.
Contrary to the conventional wisdom that views regulatory constraints as impediments to
e¤ective management, our results suggest that regulatory restrictions leading parent rms
to set transfer prices at market value may serve as a precommitment device, thus playing
a strategic role benecial to rms: the Arms Length Principle serves to credibly convey to
external parties that the related party price is above marginal cost, ensuring commitment
and observability.
In the absence of the ALP, it has been established that vertical separation intensies or
alleviates competition depending on the nature of the oligopolistic competition: When rms
compete in prices, vertical separation softens competition, whereas when rms compete in
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quantities vertical separation induces rms to compete more aggressively  see Vickers
(1985), Fershtman and Judd (1987), Sklivas (1987), Alles and Datar (1998). When the
adoption of the ALP leads to market based transfer pricing, our results provide a rationale
for vertical separation also when rms compete in quantities. Göx (2000) and Dürr and Göx
(2011) show that when rms compete in prices, the ALP reinforces the e¤ect of vertical
separation on softening competition. Contrary to Göxs (2000) claim that this result does
not ... carry over to the case of quantity competition because quantities are strategic
substitutes...,our results show the ALP softens competition even in this case. Moreover,
quantity competition provides a reduced form model for the analysis of more complex forms
of imperfect competition; e.g., capacity choice followed by some kind of price competition
see Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) and Moreno and Ubeda (2006).
In our framework there are two markets, which we refer to as the Latin market and the
Greek market. There are two rms engaging in Cournot competition in the Latin market.
These rms have subsidiaries, which in turn engage in Cournot competition in the Greek
market. We begin by considering two alternative transfer pricing schemes for intrarm
transactions. Since competition in the Latin market provides a market price to impose
on comparable market transactions, we study market based transfer pricing (MB) as the
equivalent to the ALP as the OECD recommends.27 Alternatively, we consider transfer
pricing not linked to the Latin market, i.e., non-market based transfer pricing (NMB). We
show that MB transfer pricing typically leads to a lower total surplus, and may lead to
larger prots, than NMB transfer pricing.
Under NMB transfer pricing a parents decisions of how much to produce in the Latin
market and what transfer price to charge to its subsidiary are independent. In equilibrium,
parents set transfer prices below marginal cost in an attempt to gain a Stackelberg advantage
27Choe and Matsushima (2013) examine the e¤ect of ALP on dynamic competition in imperfectly compet-
itive markets and show that the ALP results in more stable tacit collusion. They consider a vertically related
market with two upstream rms which supply to their downstream a¢ liates and other unrelated buyers in
the downstream market. The authors consider the price upstream rms charge to unrelated buyers as the
comparable uncontrolled price for applying the ALP. In our setting, the price in the home market provides
a reliable measure of an arms length result.
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in the Greek market; i.e., both parents act in a Stackelberg fashion. The equilibrium output
in the Greek market is greater than the Cournot output, and consolidated prot is below
the sum of prots at the Cournot equilibria of both markets. These results reproduce those
of Vickers (1985) in our framework.
Under MB transfer pricing a parent must transfer the good to its subsidiary at the Latin
market price. Hence, a parents output decision must internalize its impact on the transfer
price of its subsidiary and its subsidiarys rival. MB transfer pricing thus provides parents
with an instrument to soften competition in the Greek market.28 Since a parent inuences
its transfer price via its output decision in the Latin market, competition may be more
aggressive in this market. Thus, total prots under MB transfer pricing may be above that
under NMB transfer pricing. Hence the Arms Length Principle provides a rationale for
vertical separation.29 However, total surplus under MB transfer pricing is typically below
that under NMB transfer pricing, which raises some questions about the use of the ALP as
a guideline for regulating transfer prices.
We also consider the consequences of applying the ALP less rigorously by studying a
variation of the model of MB transfer pricing where parents may introduce discounts. Un-
28Arya and Mittendorf (2008) analyze market based transfer pricing as a strategic response in a similar
setting. They show that ALP makes rms more aware of the fact that excessive home market prices
depress external production (i.e., the concern is about double marginalization). Thus, as a result rms may
become more aggressive in the home market. However, the authors do not acknowledge that ALP increases
prevailing transfer prices and thereby mitigates the prisoners dilemma to downstream competition. In their
model, parents rely on intracompany discounts to manage tensions between the home and the external
markets. Intracompany discounts are set prior to the stage of competition in the home market and serve as
a precommitment device. Nevertheless, this device is somewhat articial since parents must credibly bind
themselves to these discounts. In our setting, it is regulatory restriction (i.e., ALP) that serves to credibly
convey to external parties that the home market price is above marginal cost.
29Arya and Mittendorf (2007) provide an alternative rationale for vertical separation in a model in which
subsidiaries use two inputs, one that is produced internally and another one that is purchased from an
external supplier. They observe that delegating quantity decisions to a subsidiary results in a lower price
from the external supplier, overcompensating the negative e¤ect on prots of transfer prices for the internal
input above marginal cost.
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der this scheme of market based transfer pricing with discounts (MBD) each parent can
compensate the e¤ect of a high price in the Latin market on its subsidiarys cost by apply-
ing a discount. Discounts open up the possibility to gain a Stackelberg advantage in the
Greek market, bringing back the kind of prisonersdilemma that rms face under NMB
transfer pricing. However, whereas under MBD transfer pricing the equilibrium output in
the Greek market is the same as under NMB transfer pricing, the equilibrium output in
the Latin market is less competitive under MBD transfer pricing than under NMB transfer
pricing: a parent has an incentive to increase the price in the Latin market by reducing
its output and at the same time increase the discount to its subsidiary, thus increasing its
subsidiarys rival transfer price without a¤ecting the transfer price of its own subsidiary.
These incentives lead to a smaller output and a smaller total surplus in the Latin market
than under NMB.
In summary, a transfer pricing policy consistent with the Arms Length Principle is likely
to induce a surplus loss relative to the NMB transfer pricing. Thus, contrary to common
wisdom based on competitive models, under imperfect competition the adoption of the ALP
is non neutral, but has an signicant impact on market outcomes as it softens competition
either in the external market (when it is applied rigorously) or in the home market (when
its application is more lax).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the basic setup. Section 3.3
derives results for NMB transfer pricing. Section 3.4 provides an equilibrium analysis of MB
transfer pricing, and compares the properties of equilibrium under the two transfer pricing
schemes. Section 3.5 studies the impact of introducing discounts into the MB transfer
pricing scheme. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2. Model and Preliminaries
A good is sold in two markets, which we refer to as the Latin market and the Greek
market. The inverse demands in the Latin and Greek markets are pd(q) = max f0; a  bqg
and d() = max f0;  g ; respectively, where a; b;; and  are positive real numbers.
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Assuming that demands are linear facilitates the analysis and makes it easier to interpret
the results. Comparing the constant terms in each demand (i.e., the parameters a and )
allows us to consider the impact of di¤erences in the maximum willingness to pay in each
market. The parameter u := a= is a proxy for the maximum willingness to pay in the
Latin market relative to that of the Greek market. Di¤erences in the slope of the demands
(i.e., of the parameters b and ) capture the impact of di¤erences in the market size the
demand is greater the smaller the slope. The parameter s := =b is a proxy for the size of
the Greek market relative to that of the Latin market.
There are two rms producing the good at the same constant marginal cost, which is
assumed to be zero without loss of generality. Firms engage in Cournot competition in
the Latin market, and have subsidiaries which in turn engage in Cournot competition in
the Greek market. Each subsidiary receives the good from its parent rm at a transfer
price. Parent rms seek to maximize consolidated prots; since the cost of production is
zero, consolidated prots are just the sum of revenues of the parent and the subsidiary. A
subsidiary maximizes its own prots, which is the di¤erence between its revenue and its
cost. A subsidiaryunit cost is just its transfer price. We identify the parent and subsidiary
rms with the same subindex i 2 f1; 2g:
Clearly, if parents do not delegate but rather compete in quantities in the external market
as well, then in equilibrium rms produces their Cournot output in each market, and transfer
pricing policies are irrelevant.
In the Cournot equilibrium of a duopoly where the market demand is P d(Q) = maxf0; A 
BQg and rmsconstant marginal costs are (c1; c2) 2 R2+; the market price PC ; the output
QCi and prots 
C
i of rm i are
(PC ; QCi ;
C
i ) =
 
A+ c1 + c2
3
;
A  2ci + c3 i
3B
;
(A  2c1 + c2)2
9B
!
: (3.1)
If the market is monopolized by a single rm whose constant marginal cost is c 2 R+,
then the market equilibrium price PM ; output QM , and the rms prots M are
(PM ; QM ;M ) =
 
A+ c
2
;
A  c
2B
;
(A  c)2
4B
!
: (3.2)
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Using these formulae (3.1), we readily calculate the Cournot equilibrium in the Latin
market as
(pC ; qC ;CL ) =

a
3
;
a
3b
;
a2
9b

: (3.3)
Using the formulae (3.2), we obtain the monopoly equilibrium in the Latin market as
(pM ; qM ;ML ) =

a
2
;
a
2b
;
a2
4b

: (3.4)
Note that qM = 34(2q
C); i.e., in a monopoly the equilibrium output is 75% of the output in
a Cournot duopoly.
When aggregate output is q; the total surplus generated in the market is given by
S(q) =

A  Bq
2

q: (3.5)
In the Latin market, the surplus at the Cournot equilibrium, SCL ; is
SCL =
4a2
9b
; (3.6)
and the surplus at monopoly equilibrium, SML , is
SML =
3a2
8b
: (3.7)
Replacing a with  and b with  yields formulae analogous for the Cournot and monopoly
equilibria in the Greek market. (These formulae assume that rmsconstant marginal cost
of production is zero). We use the notation C , C , CG; S
C
G , and 
M ; M ;MG ; S
M
G ; for
the values of output, price, prots and surplus at the Cournot duopoly equilibrium, and
monopoly equilibrium of the market, respectively.
3.3. Non-Market Based Transfer Pricing
Assume that the parent rms simultaneously decide the transfer prices they charge to
their subsidiaries, knowing that these rms will engage in Cournot competition in the Greek
market; i.e., each parent rm i 2 f1; 2g sets its transfer price ti 2 R so as to maximize
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consolidated prots. (Of course, a parent rm may provide the good to a subsidiary at
a subsidized cost, which implies, since the unit cost is zero, that transfer prices may be
negative.) The equilibrium under this scheme of non-market based (NMB) transfer pricing
is determined as follows.
For (t1; t2), the equilibrium in the Greek market is that of a Cournot duopoly where rms
constant marginal costs are (t1; t2); i.e., the output of rm i 2 f1; 2g is
i = i (t1; t2) =
  2ti + t3 i
3
:
Thus, parent i solves the problem
max
(qi;ti)2R+R
pd(q1 + q2)qi + 
d(1(t1; t2) + 2(t1; t2))i(t1; t2):
Since parent is choice of transfer prices ti does not a¤ect its revenue in the Latin market,
nor its output decisions in the Latin market qi a¤ect its revenue in the Greek market. Hence,
these two decisions can be treated independently; i.e., qi (ti) is chosen to maximize revenue
in the Latin (Greek) market. Thus, the equilibrium outcome in the Latin market is just the
Cournot equilibrium outcome.
We calculate the equilibrium outcome in the Greek market. Parent i chooses its transfer
price ti so as to maximize its subsidiarys revenue in the Greek market,
d (1 (t1; t2) + 2 (t1; t2)) i (t1; t2) :
Hence, parent is reaction to the transfer price set up by its competitor, t3 i; is
ri(t3 i) =   t3 i + 
4
:
Therefore, the equilibrium transfer prices are
t1 = t

2 =  

5
:
Substituting these values into the equation for i (t1; t2) and using (3.1) we get the sub-
sidiariesoutputs
1 (t

1; t

2) = 2 (t

1; t

2) =
2
5
=
6
5
C := NMB:
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Hence the equilibrium price in the Greek market is
d
 
2NMB

=

5
=
3
5
C := NMB:
Total prots are
NMBL +
NMB
G = p
CqC + NMBNMB (3.8)
= CL +
18
25
CG:
And total surplus is
SNMBL + S
NMB
G = S
C
L +

  
2
 
2NMB

2NMB (3.9)
= SCL +
27
25
SCG :
We summarize these results in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1. Under non-market based transfer pricing:
(3.1.1) The equilibrium output in the Latin market is the Cournot output, i.e.,
qNMB = qC :
(3.1.2) The equilibrium output in the Greek is above the Cournot output, i.e.,
NMB =
6
5
C :
(3.1.3) Firmsprots are
(NMBL ;
NMB
G ) = (
C
L ;
18
25
CG):
Hence, total prots are below their prots at the Cournot equilibria of these markets.
(3.1.4) The surpluses in the Latin and Greek markets are
(SNMBL ; S
NMB
G ) = (S
C
L ;
27
25
SCG):
Thus, the total surplus is above the surplus at the Cournot equilibria of these markets.
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The strategic considerations behind this result are clear: delegating output decision to
subsidiaries induces parents to compete more aggressively in the Greek market, relative to
a setting in which parents exercise direct control of the subsidiarys output. By reducing
its transfer price below marginal cost, parents attempt to gain a kind of Stackelberg leader
status, creating a sort of prisonersdilemma situation. As a consequence, the equilibrium
outcome in the Greek market is more e¢ cient than the Cournot outcome. Analogous
results are found by Vickers (1985), Judd and Fershtman (1987), Sklivas (1987), and Alles
and Datar (1998).
3.4. Market Based Transfer Pricing
In this section, we assume, consistently with the Arms Length Principle, that subsidiaries
buy the good from parents at the price at which the good trades in the Latin market, which
is known to the rms competing in the Greek market at the time of making output decisions.
In this setup, parents act as leadersanticipating the reactions of subsidiary rms. The
equilibrium under this scheme of market based (MB) transfer pricing is determined as
follows.30
Assuming that the price in the Latin market is p  0; each subsidiary i 2 f1; 2g chooses
its output i to solve the problem
max
i2R+
(d (1 + 2)  p)i:
Here p is the constant marginal cost of the subsidiary rms. Using the formulae (3.1), we
calculate equilibrium outputs for p  0 as
1 = 

2 = ^(p) =
  p
3
:
Parents, anticipating the outputs in the Greek market, choose their output qi in order to
30Dürr and Göx (2011) assume that rms can arbitrarily choose a transfer price from an allowable ex-
ogenous range of ALP prices, withstanding a possible examination of authorities in the two markets. In
the next section we consider a lax application of the ALP where e¤ective transfer prices are determined
endogenously.
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solve
max
qi2R+
pd(q1 + q2)qi + 
d(^1(p
d(q1 + q2)) + ^2(p
d(q1 + q2)))^i(p
d(q1 + q2)):
Solving the system of equations formed by the rst-order condition for prot maximization
of parents 1 and 2 we obtain their outputs,
q1 = q

2 =
(4b+ 9)a  b
b (8b+ 27)
:= qMB: (3.10)
The equilibrium price in the Latin market is
pd(2qMB) =
9a + 2b
8b+ 27
:= pMB:
Substituting the value of pMB into equation ^(p) we obtain the equilibrium subsidiaries
outputs,
1 = 

2 = ^(p
MB) =
(2b+ 9)  3a
(8b+ 27)
:= MB: (3.11)
The equilibrium price in the Greek market is
d(2MB) =
6a + 4b+ 9
8b+ 27
:= MB:
For the equilibrium to be interior we must have
(4b+ 9) a  4b > 0;
i.e.,
u >
1
4 + 9s
:= l(s);
and
(9 + 2b)  3a > 0;
i.e.,
u < 3 +
2
3s
:= g(s):
Thus, equilibrium is interior whenever
l(s) < u < g(s); (3.12)
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Figure 3.1. Total prots under MB and NMB transfer pricing.
holds. The thin and thick curves in Figure 3.1 below displays the graphs of the functions
l and g, respectively. For parameter constellations (s; u) lying between these curves the
equilibrium is interior.
If u  g(s), then rmsequilibrium outputs are qMB = qC and MB = 0; that is, for
parameter constellations lying above the thick curve of Figure 3.1 double marginalization
leads to a complete shut down of the Greek market. And if u  l(s), then rmsequilibrium
outputs are qMB = 0 and MB = ( a)=3; that is, for parameter constellations below the
thin line of Figure 3.1, it pays to shut down the Latin market in order to soften competition
in the Greek market among subsidiaries as much as possible.
Assuming that (3.12) holds, so that both markets are active, and using again (3.3), we
can rewrite the expression for rmsoutput in the Latin market (3.10) as
qMB = qC +
4
3 (8b+ 27)

u  3
4

:
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Likewise, using equations (3.3) and (3.4) we can write the expression for rmsoutput in
the Greek market (3.11) as
MB = C   9a + 2b
3 (8b+ 27)
=
M
2
  3
(8b+ 27)

u  3
4

:
Thus, under MB transfer pricing whether the output in the Latin market is above or below
the Cournot output (which is also their output under NMB pricing by Proposition 3.1)
depends on the sign of u 3=4. This term is positive whenever the maximum willingness to
pay in the Latin market relative to that in the Greek market is su¢ ciently large (at least
75%), and it is negative otherwise. However, the output in the Greek market is always below
the Cournot output (and therefore, it is below the output under NMB transfer pricing by
Proposition 3.1). Note also that double marginalization imposed by MB transfer pricing
leads to an output in the Greek market that is below the monopoly output when u > 3=4:
We have
@qMB
@
=   36
(8b+ 27)2

u  3
4

;
and
@MB
@b
=
24
(8b+ 27)2

u  3
4

:
Hence, the signs of these derivatives are also determined by the sign of u  3=4. If u > 3=4;
then the output in the Latin (Greek) market decreases (increases) with  (b). It is easy to
see why: only if the willingness to pay in the Latin market is su¢ ciently large relative to
that of the Greek market (i.e., u > 3=4), it is worthwhile responding to an increase of the
Greek market size (i.e., a smaller ) with an increase of the output in the Latin market,
thus reducing the transfer price and avoiding a large reduction of the sales of the subsidiary.
The equilibrium output in the Latin market satises
lim
!0
qMB = qC +

6b

u  3
4

:= qMB0 ;
and
lim
!1
qMB = qC :
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Thus, as the size of the Greek market becomes large (i.e.,  becomes small), the output
in the Latin market is above or below the Cournot output depending on the sign of u  
3=4. If u > 3=4; then parents incentives to increase their output in order to alleviate
double marginalization remains as the size of the Greek market becomes arbitrarily large.
When u < 3=4, however, parents reduce their output in the Latin market as a way to
commit to high prices in the Greek market. Of course, as the size of the Greek market
becomes arbitrarily small (i.e.,  approaches innity), parents tend to ignore the double
marginalization problem (as the prots in this market become negligible), and focus on
the impact on their output decision in the Latin market, and their output approaches the
Cournot output, independently of the sign of u  3=4:
The equilibrium output in the Greek market satises
lim
b!1
MB =
M
2
;
and
lim
b!0
MB = C   a
9
=
M
2
  
9

u  3
4

:= MB0 :
Thus, as the size of the Latin market becomes arbitrarily small (i.e., b approaches innity),
the revenues in this market become negligible, and parentsoutput decisions mainly serve
the purpose of committing to high prices in the Greek market.
Interestingly, MB transfer pricing allows parents to attain perfect cooperation (i.e., they
are able to sustain the monopoly outcome) when b approaches innity. In this case, MB
transfer pricing is merely an instrument to avoid competition in the Greek market. When
the size of the Latin market becomes arbitrarily large (i.e., b approaches zero), however,
revenues mainly come from the Latin market and therefore, parents tend to ignore the
impact of double marginalization in the Greek market, producing the Cournot output in
the Latin market. Double marginalization leads to an output below the Cournot output,
and has its worst e¤ects whenever u > 3=4, in which case output falls even below the
monopoly output.
We summarize these results in Proposition 3.2.
Proposition 3.2. Under market based transfer pricing:
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(3.2.1) If 1=(4 + 9s) < u < 3 + 2=3s; then the equilibrium is interior. In equilibrium: The
output in the Latin market qMB is above or below the Cournot output, and decreases or
increases with the size of the Greek market  depending on whether u is above or below
3=4, i.e.,
qMB T qC = qNMB and @q
MB
@
S 0 if and only if u T 3
4
:
The output in the Greek market MB is below the Cournot outcome, i.e.,
MB < C < NMB,
and is below or above the monopoly output and increases or decreases with the size of the
Latin market b depending on whether u is above or below 3=4, i.e.,
MB S 
M
2
and
@MB
@b
T 0 if and only if u T 3
4
:
Further, as  becomes large qMB approaches qC ; and as  becomes small qMB approaches
qMB0 ; where q
MB
0 T qC whenever u T 3=4: And as b becomes large MB approaches 
M
2 ;
and as b becomes small MB approaches MB0 < 
C ; where MB0 T 
M
2 whenever u S 3=4:
(3.2.2) If u  1=(4 + 9s), then equilibrium outputs are qMB = 0 and MB = (   a)=3.
And if u  3 + 2=3s, then equilibrium outputs are qMB = qC and MB = 0:
Let us analyze the prots under MB transfer pricing. In an interior equilibrium rms
total prots can be calculated using (3.8) as
MBL +
MB
G = 
NMB
L +
NMB
G +
b22 
64b2 + 432b2 + 7293
;
where
 =  

30s2 +
64
9
s

u2 +
 
8s+ 36s2

u+
567
25
s2 +
436
25
s+
72
25
:
Write
 (s) =
810s2 + 180s+
p
2 (24 + 81s)
p
155s2 + 36s
10s (135s+ 32)
;
for the value of u that solves  = 0 given s: Then we have  R 0; and therefore MBL +
MBG R NMBL +NMBG ; whenever u Q  (s) :
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The dashed curve in Figure 3.1 above displays the function . (Recall that the thin and
thick curves represent the functions l and g; respectively.) For the equilibrium to be interior,
the values of s and u must lie between these two curves. Note  is decreasing in s and
lim
s!1(s) =
3
5
 
1 +
p
310
10
!
:= 1 ' 1:6564:
Thus, when equilibrium is interior and u is below 1 total prots under MB transfer pricing
are greater than under NMB transfer pricing even if the size of the Greek market is small
relative to that of the Latin market (i.e., s is large).
We also examine total prots at corner equilibria. When u  g(s), then rmsequilibrium
outputs are qMB = qC = qNMB and MB = 0 < NMB. Hence total prots are
MBL +
MB
G = 
NMB
L + 0 < 
NMB
L +
NMB
G :
When u  l(s), then rmsequilibrium outputs are qMB = 0 < qNMB and MB = ( a)3 <
C < NMB. Hence total prots are
MBG = 
NMB
L +
NMB
G +
2^
225
;
where
^ = 7  25u (2u+ su  1) :
Hence, we have ^ R 0; and therefore MBL +MBG R NMBL +NMBG ; whenever
u S 5 +
p
28s+ 81
20 + 10s
:= ^(s):
Since
l(s)  ^(s) < 0;
for all s; then u  l(s) implies
u < ^(s);
and therefore
MBL +
MB
G > 
NMB
L +
NMB
G :
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Thus, in corner equilibria that arise when the willingness to pay in the Latin market
relative to that of the Greek market u is small (i.e., when u  l(s) < 1=4) rms total
prots under MB transfer pricing are greater than under NMB, whereas in the corner
equilibria that arise when u is large (i.e., when u  g(s) > 3), rmstotal prots under MB
transfer pricing are smaller than under NMB transfer pricing.
In summary, for parameter constellations (s; u) that lie below (above) the graph of  (the
dashed curve in Figure 3.1) rmsprots under MB transfer pricing are above (below) their
prots under NMB transfer pricing. Proposition 3.3 summarizes our results.
Proposition 3.3. Total prots under market based transfer pricing are above or below total
prots under non-market based transfer pricing depending on whether u is above or below
(s); i.e.,
MBL +
MB
G R NMBL +NMBG if and only if u Q  (s) :
In particular, if u < 1 ' 1:6564; then total prots under market based transfer pricing
are above total prots under non-market based transfer pricing.
Let us study the total surplus under MB transfer pricing. In an interior equilibrium we
calculate the surplus in the Latin market under MB transfer pricing using equation (3.5) as
SMBL = S
NMB
L +
8 (27a + b (4a+ 3))
9 (8b+ 27)2

u  3
4

:
Therefore SMBL T SNMBL whenever u T 3=4: Using again equation (3.5), we calculate the
surplus in the Greek market under MB transfer pricing as
SMBG = S
NMB
G  
6
25
(5a +  (2b+ 3)) (15a + 2 (7b+ 18))
 (8b+ 27)2
:
Hence SMBG < S
NMB
G :
Thus, in an interior equilibrium the comparison of total surplus under MB and NMB
transfer pricing is as follows: if u  3=4; then the surplus under MB transfer pricing is
below the surplus under NMB transfer pricing in both markets, and so is total surplus, i.e.,
SMBL +S
MB
G < S
NMB
L +S
NMB
G . If u > 3=4, then we have S
MB
L > S
NMB
L ; but S
MB
G < S
NMB
G :
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Thus, the comparison of total surplus under MB and NMB transfer pricing is ambiguous.
We have
SMBL + S
MB
G = S
NMB
L + S
NMB
G +
2b22 S
225 (8b+ 27)2
;
where
S = 25s (27s+ 16)u2   2700s (3s+ 1)u  2916s2   3303s  756:
Write
 (s) =
4050s2 + 15 (27s+ 8)
p
7s (16s+ 3) + 1350s
400s+ 675s2
:
for the solution to the equation S = 0 given s. Hence S R 0; and therefore SMBL + SMBG R
SNMBL + S
NMB
G ; whenever u R  (s).
The dashed curve in Figure 3.2 displays the function  . (Here again the thin and thick
curves in Figure 3.2 represents the functions l and g; respectively. Recall that the equilib-
rium is interior under MB transfer pricing for parameter constellations (s; u) lying between
these two curves.)
The minimum value of  is  = 2720
p
7 + 6 ' 9:5718. Thus, for u <  the total surplus
under MB transfer pricing is below the total surplus under NMB transfer pricing. Only for
parameter constellations (s; u) satisfying  (s) < u < g(s) we have
SMBL + S
MB
G > S
NMB
L + S
NMB
G :
As Figure 3.2 illustrates, these parameter constellations involve a large willingness to pay
in the Latin market relative to that of the Greek market u (larger than 249=25 ' 9:96),
and a small size of the Greek market relative to that of the Latin market s (smaller than
25=261 ' :095), and form a small subset of the parameter space.
Let us examine the total surplus at corner equilibria. If u  g(s), then rmsequilibrium
outputs are qMB = qC = qNMB and MB = 0 < NMB, and the total surplus satises
SMBL + S
MB
G = S
NMB
L + 0 < S
NMB
L + S
NMB
G :
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Figure 3.2. Total welfare under MB and NMB transfer pricing.
If u  l(s); then rmsequilibrium outputs are qMB = 0 < qNMB and MB = ( a)3 <
C < NMB. Hence SMBL = 0 and S
MB
G < S
NMB
G : Therefore
SMBL + S
MB
G < S
NMB
L + S
NMB
G :
Thus, in every corner equilibrium the total surplus under MB transfer pricing is below the
total surplus under NMB transfer pricing.
The total surplus under MB transfer pricing is below the total surplus under NMB transfer
pricing except for the small set of parameter constellations (s; u) in the area below the graph
of g and above the graph of  ; i.e., for (s; u) satisfying  (s) < u < g(s). As Figure 3.2
illustrates, for these parameter constellations the increment in surplus due to the increment
in output in the Latin market under MB transfer pricing relative to that under NMB transfer
pricing, qMB > qC = qNMB; more than compensates the reduction in surplus due to the
reduction of the output in the Greek market, MB < C < NMB. Proposition 3.4 states
these results.
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Proposition 3.4. The total surplus under market based transfer pricing is typically smaller
than under non-market based transfer pricing. Specically, only if (s; u) satises
 (s) < u < g(s)
is the total surplus under market based transfer pricing larger than under non-market based
transfer pricing. This condition requires that the maximum willingness to pay in the Latin
market relative to that of the Greek market u be large (larger than 9.95) and the size of the
Latin market relative to that of the Greek market s be small (smaller than 0.095).
MB transfer pricing provides parent rms with an instrument to limit aggressive competi-
tion in the Greek market, and may allow them to induce an outcome close to the monopoly
outcome when the size of the Greek market relative to that of the Latin market is large. Of
course, since a parent inuences its transfer price only via its output decision in the Latin
market, competition in this market may be more aggressive than under NMB transfer pric-
ing, provided the maximum willingness to pay in this market is not too small compared
to that of the Greek market. For some parameter constellations, total prots under MB
transfer pricing are above that under NMB transfer pricing. Thus, under quantity com-
petition the Arms Length Principle provides a rationale for vertical separation. However,
total surplus under MB transfer pricing is typically below that under NMB transfer pricing,
which raises some questions about the use of the ALP as a guideline for regulating transfer
prices.
3.5. Market Based Transfer Pricing with Discounts
In order to discuss the consequences of a lax application of the ALP, we consider an alter-
native setting where transfer prices are market based, but parents apply discounts to their
subsidiaries. Such practices are common. Baldenius, Melumad, and Reichelstein (2004)
argue that this is a frequent practice, which is justied due to cost di¤erences between
internal and external transactions. Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006) examine U.S. inter-
national export transaction between 1993 and 2000, and nd that prices of U.S. exports
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are substantially larger than transfer prices for subsidiaries. In addition, they nd that
the wedge between the market prices and related-party prices is negatively correlated with
destination-country corporate tax rates, and positively correlated with both destination-
country import tari¤s and other characteristics indicating greater market power. Baldenius
and Reichelstein (2005) also cite examples of rms adjusting prevailing market prices for
internal transfers. Of course, failure to comply with the Arms Length Principle may result
in penalties, which rms may have to optimally trade o¤. We abstract away from penalties,
and focus our analysis on the strategic consequences of a lax application of the ALP.
In our setting, each parent rm chooses simultaneously its output in the Latin market as
well as the discount that will apply to its subsidiary. Then each subsidiary, knowing the
price in the Latin market, its own discount and that of its rival, competes in quantities in
the Greek market.31
The equilibrium under this scheme of market based transfer pricing with discounts (MBD)
is determined as follows. Assuming that the price in the Latin market is p 2 R+ and
discounts are (1; 2) 2 R2+, each subsidiary i 2 f1; 2g chooses its output i to solve the
problem
max
i2R+
(d (1 + 2)  (p  i))i;
Here the term p  i is the constant marginal cost of subsidiary i. Using the equation (3.1),
we calculate the equilibrium outputs in the Greek market as a function of the price in the
Latin market and the parentsdiscounts, which are given by
i = ~i(p; 1; 2) =
  p+ 2i   3 i
3
:
Parent rm i, anticipating the outputs and market price in the Greek market, chooses its
31Arya and Mittendorf (2008) analyze transfer pricing policy as a strategic response to external competition
in a similar setting. In their model, however, discounts are set prior to the stage of competition in the Latin
market.
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outputs qi and its discount i in order to solve the problem
max
(qi;2)2R2+
pd(q1+q2)qi+
d(~1

pd(q1 + q2); 1; 2

+~2

pd(q1 + q2); 1; 2

)~i

pd(q1 + q2); 1; 2

Solving the system of equations formed by the rst-order conditions for prot maximization
of parents 1 and 2 we obtain their outputs and discounts in an interior equilibrium. In the
Latin market, parentsoutputs are
q1 = q

2 =
a
3b
  
15
:= qMBD;
and the market price is
pd(2qNMD) =
a
3
+
2
15
b

:= pMBD; (3.13)
Equilibrium discounts are
1 = 

2 =
5a + 2b+ 3
15
:= : (3.14)
and thus, transfer prices are given by
pMBD    =  
5
:
Note that transfer prices are negative, i.e., transfer prices are below marginal cost. Sub-
stituting these values into the equation above, we obtain the subsidiariesoutputs
~i
 
pMBD; ; 

=
2
5


:= MBD:
The market price in the Greek market is
d(2MBD) =

5
:= MBD:
For the equilibrium to be interior we must have
a

>
b
5
;
i.e.,
u > h(s) :=
1
5s
: (3.15)
If u  h(s); then in equilibrium qMBD = 0 and MBD = 25  : The solid curve in Figure
3.3 below represents the function h and the area above the graph of h corresponds to the
parameter constellations (s; u) for which the equilibrium is interior.
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Figure 3.3. Total prots under MBD and NMB transfer pricing.
Using again (3.3) and (3.10), we can rewrite the expression for rmsoutput in the Latin
market as
qMBD = qC   1
5
C ;
and the output in the Greek market as
MBD =
6
5
C :
Since qNMB = qC and NMB = 65
C by Proposition 3.1, then qMBD < qNMB and
MBD = NMB; that is, under MBD transfer pricing the output in the Latin (Greek)
market is below (equal to) the output under NMB transfer pricing.
It is also interesting to compare the output under MBD and MB transfer pricing. We
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have
qMB   qMBD = 4
3 (8b+ 27)

u  3
4

+
1
5
C
=
4
15

 (8b+ 27)
(2b+ 3 + 5u)
> 0;
i.e., qMB > qMBD: Also, propositions 1 and 2 and the results above imply MBD > MB.
Hence the equilibrium outcome in the Latin (Greek) market is less (more) competitive under
MBD than under MB transfer pricing; i.e., a lax application of the ALP makes competition
softer (more aggressive) in the parents(subsidiaries) market.
Discounts open up the possibility to gain a Stackelberg advantage in the Greek market,
and bring back a prisoners dilemma analogous to that rms face under NMB transfer
pricing. Under MBD transfer pricing, however, parentsoutput decisions in the two markets
are not independent: a parent by reducing its output in the Latin market and simultaneously
increasing its discount, rises the marginal cost of its subsidiarys rival without a¤ecting the
marginal cost of its own subsidiary. Therefore, linking the cost of its subsidiarys rivals to
the price in the Latin market makes competition more aggressive in the Greek market and
less aggressive in the Latin market. In fact, when condition (3.15) does not hold, parents
choose to completely shut down the Latin market. Note that a parents incentive to reduce
its output in order to increase the transfer price of its subsidiarys rival increases with both
the maximum willingness to pay and the size of the Greek market relative to those of the
Latin market. These results are stated in Proposition 3.5.
Proposition 3.5. Under market based transfer pricing with discounts, the output in the
Greek market is
MBD =
6
5
C = NMB > MB:
Moreover, if u > 1=5s; then the output in the Latin market is
qMBD = qC   1
5
C < qNMB;
satises qMBD < qMB, and approaches qCas  becomes large and/or  becomes small, and
if u  1=5s; then qMBD = 0.
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Let us study prots under MBD transfer pricing. If u > h(s), then the equilibrium is
interior and we can calculate rmsprots in the Latin market under MBD transfer pricing
using (3.8) as
MBDL = 
NMB
L +
2
45

u  2
5s

= NMBL +
2
45
(u  2h(s)) :
Since, MBDG = 
NMB
G ; we have 
MBD
L +
MBD
G S NMBL +NMBG if and only if u S 2h(s).
If u  h(s); then in equilibrium qMBD = 0 < qNMBD and MBD = 25  = NMB: Hence
MBDL +
MBD
G = 0 + 
NMB
G < 
NMB
L +
NMB
G :
Therefore MBDL + 
MBD
G < 
NMB
L + 
NMB
G if and only if u < 2h(s): The dashed curve
in Figure 3.3 displays the function 2h: Parameter constellations (s; u) that lie above (be-
low) this curve correspond to those for which total prots under MBD transfer pricing are
greater than (less than or equal to) total prots under NMB transfer pricing. This result is
established in Proposition 3.6.
Proposition 3.6. Under market based transfer pricing with discounts, total prots are
above (below) total prots under non-market based transfer pricing whenever u is above
(below) 2h(s).
Finally, we study the total surplus under MBD transfer pricing. If the equilibrium is
interior, i.e., if u > h(s); then the surplus in the Latin market is
SMBDL = S
NMB
L  
2
45
2


u+
1
5s

:
Hence, SMBDL < S
NMB
L : Since S
MBD
G = S
NMB
G , we have
SMBDL + S
MBD
G < S
NMB
L + S
NMB
G :
In a corner equilibrium, i.e., when u  h(s); we have qMBD = 0 < qNMB and MBD =
(6=5)C = NMB; and therefore
SMBDL + S
MBD
G = 0 + S
NMB
G < S
NMB
L + S
NMB
G :
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Hence total surplus under MBD transfer pricing is unambiguously below total surplus under
NMB transfer pricing. This result is stated in Proposition 3.7.
Proposition 3.7. Under market based transfer pricing with discounts, total surplus is
unambiguously below total surplus under non-market based transfer pricing.
In summary, market based transfer pricing with discounts generates a subtle link between
markets that softens competition in the home market as each parent attempts to increase
the transfer price of its subsidiarys rivals in order to gain a competitive advantage in the
external market.
3.6. Conclusions
While a regulatory policy requiring that transfer prices be consistent with the Arms
Length Principle does not a¤ect market outcomes under perfect competition, in imperfectly
competitive markets with vertically separated rms it modies the strategic nature of rms
interactions and ultimately has an impact on market outcomes. Specically, the application
of the ALP serves as a commitment device that softens competition. When the ALP is
applied rigorously, the result is a softer competition in the subsidiaries(external) market
that is not compensated for by a more aggressive competition in the parents(home) market.
A more lax application of the ALP softens competition in the home market. Interestingly,
vertical separation, an organizational structure whose motivation is not well understood in
the absence of frictions, may be justied under transfer pricing policies based on the ALP.
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